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COMMUNICATION OF LEGAL STANDARDS,
POLICY DEVELOPMENT, AND
EFFECTIVE CONDUCT
REGULATION
Daniel J. Giffordt
The purpose of this article is to inquire into some of the problems
of conduct regulation associated with the formulation of laws and other
conduct standards by officials and the transmission of the formulated
standards to affected persons. Although legal policy formulation and
the communication of such policy can be separate fields for inquiry,
they are nevertheless interrelated. If communication is characterized as
the transmission of information, then officially-promulgated conduct
standards that are couched in highly general or vague language transmit
less information to affected persons about how to act than do standards
that are more precise. Such language vagueness suggests both minimal
communication and openness to policy development. Thus, in the
familiar case in which a judge "interprets" or "construes" meaning
into a law, we observe that the need for the interpretation arose from
the imprecision or ambiguity of the law as it existed prior to that judi-
cial decision. If the interpretation adds content to the law, we will be
correct in stating that (1) the original law lacked some content that was
later added to it; and (2) the process of determining or completing that
law's meaning took place over time. Accordingly, a person who learned
of the law prior to the judicial decision interpreting it could have
learned only some of the meaning that the law ultimately contained.
Imprecision-or open-endedness-in laws permits substantive de-
velopment that necessarily takes place over time. The central concerns
of this article are problems inherent in the communication of legal
knowledge as they are affected by the interplay of imprecision in laws
and law development over time. The discussion proceeds from an
initial focus upon the more general problems of communication by
officials to affected persons to a focus upon the problems of policy de-
velopment and communication in the special context of modern regu-
latory agencies.
t Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. A.B. 1953, Holy Cross
College; LL.B. 1958, Harvard University.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
I
PROBLEMS AssocIATED wi TE COMMUNICATION
OF CONDUCT STANDARDS
A. Lack of Technical Legal Knowledge
It is axiomatic that no person can guide his conduct by a law unless
he knows what that law is. It is also reasonably apparent that most per-
sons do not know the detailed contents of the laws that affect them1 and
that they possess, at most, only generalized and nontechnical knowledge
of those laws. Their conduct, then, insofar as it is influenced by laws at
all, cannot be guided by the detailed technicalities of those laws, but
must be guided by their generalized and nontechnical knowledge. More-
over, many laws that may appear superficially to be guides to conduct
may not be such guides at all: they may embody community moral stand-
ards and merely reflect social activity rather than guide it. Sometimes
laws that embody community standards are said to reenforce those
standards.2 But how can they reenforce moral standards if it is those
standards rather than the law to which most persons conform? Perhaps
it is because a violation of the moral standard-such as the moral pro-
hibition against stealing-will often run afoul of the law as well. If the
converse is also true, then the law's prohibitions will never be trans-
gressed by persons who conform to the moral standard-even though
they have little or no knowledge of exactly what the law prohibits.
A person who has overcome his own moral scruples against steal-
ing may focus upon the legal prohibition and the threat of pun-
ishment and disgrace accompanying its violation. For him the law
would become the primary standard, superseding his conscience. But
even for such a person the primary standard is the law as he apprehends
it, and not the law as it is written. For the habitually honest majority,
the specter of the law's sanctions may reenforce inclinations to honesty
in moments of temptation. But here again, the reenforcement depends
not upon what the law actually provides but upon our perceptions of
what the law provides. Since, as we have observed, most of us rarely
1 For an illustration of this statement, see Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status,
Causes and Proposed Remedies, in TnE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 56
(H. Jones ed. 1965). See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.). But
cf. People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, 145-46, 183 N.E. 273, 276 (1932).
2 Decisions to avoid law-violating conduct may be reenforced not only by an appre-
hended threat of punishment but also by the satisfaction of believing that others who do
violate the laws will be punished. Cf. H. HART, THE CONCrEP OF LAw 193 (1961). See also
Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CaMM. L.C. & P.S. 176, 180 (1952),
(referring to legal sanctions as reenforcements to moral inhibitions).
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possess a full grasp of the law in its full technical complexity, general,
nontechnical understandings of law usually perform the described re-
enforcement function.
B. Communication and Obedience to Law
Punishments are meted out for violating the law found in the
statute books or in judicial decisions. The general and undetailed un-
derstanding of the law by an actor is rarely relevant to an official
determination of his guilt. Yet it would be an exceptional case in
which an actor's understanding of the law he is charged with violating
was the same as his judge's. If we ask the reason for this dichotomy
between the law that guides conduct and the law that judges it, we
are likely to be met with the assertions that inquiries into defendants'
subjective understandings of laws are impractical and fraught with
danger, and that presupposing universal and accurate legal knowledge
generally encourages the public to learn of the laws that pertain to
them3 and prevents defendants from escaping punishment by feigning
misunderstanding or ignorance.4 But if the public in general lack
knowledge of most of the legal technicalities that pertain to their
respective activities, these are at best incomplete and inadequate replies.
Where do the technical complexities of the law come from? Why
does the law concern itself with larceny, larceny by trick, embezzlement,
and burglary rather than simply with stealing? Why is it relevant
whether a stolen item was taken from the "possession" of its owner,
especially when this "possession" may be a highly artificial one? Why
is a "breaking" relevant? One answer to these questions lies in historical
development; another answer may be that the technical criteria em-
bodied in the definitions of these separate crimes serve to distinguish,
in the forbidden activities, degrees of "badness" or of danger to others.
A thief who enters a house from the outside may be more dangerous
than a dishonest servant; an embezzler may be less dangerous than a
holdup man. Again, especially in connection with more recently en-
acted statutory crimes, the legislature may define an offense in detail
to minimize dispute over the scope of the prohibition. The detail
serves as some insurance that the scope of the prohibition will not be
enlarged in criminal trials to include, retrospectively, the conduct there
8 This seems to be Blackstone's rationale for imputing knowledge of laws to the
public. 1 W. BLAOSrONE, Co ErNARIms *46.
4 Cf. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOMr IN THE
AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 95, 108 (S. Hook ed. 1961).
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being judged.5 But the very detail that produces this salutary effect
will rarely be known by the persons to whom the law applies.
In attempting to evaluate the effects of the seeming dichotomy
between a detailed, technical or official version of a law and its un-
detailed, nontechnical or popular version, it is appropriate to consider
Professor H. L. A. Hart's approach to the classic (and contrary-to-fact)
presumption of universally and accurately held legal knowledge among
people and among various classes and groups.6 Professor Hart distin-
guishes between "primary rules of obligation" and "secondary rules."
Primary rules of obligation are the rules that impose duties upon per-
sons;1 secondary rules provide the criteria for determining the validity
of primary rules, procedures for their administration, and penalties for
their violation." According to Hart, primary rules must be generally
obeyed;9 by inference, the knowledge requisite for such obedience must
be disseminated. He admits, however, that knowledge of secondary
rules is largely confined to lawyers, judges, and government officials. 10
He thus concedes the great divergence among people in the amount
and accuracy of their legal knowledge, without acknowledging the po-
tential injustice that could infect a system in which. the mass of people
obeyed one set of rules but were punished for deviating from a differ-
ent (and to them unknown) set of rules.
The success of Hart's approach, accordingly, depends upon his as-
sumption that primary rules of obligation are generally obeyed, 1 which
implies a corollary assumption that knowledge of those rules is gener-
ally shared by the public. Hart does not, however, deem it essential
that knowledge of the primary rules be generally held; it is sufficient
if they are generally obeyed. Certainly some knowledge is requisite for
obeying them, but what kind of knowledge: knowledge of the laws on
the statute books, or of some popular versions of those laws? Hart says
that the rules which must be generally obeyed are "those rules of be-
5 Some precisely-drawn laws, however, include within the scope of their prohibitions
actions that the legislature did not intend to cover. The precision in coverage is designed
to eliminate disputes at trial over coverage and thus to prevent "bad" persons from avail-
ing themselves of an excuse. Those persons whose acts fall within the literal scope of the
law's prohibition but whose acts are not viewed as antisocial by the legislature are ex-
pected to receive their protection from "selective enforcement" by prosecutors. See L.
FULLER, THE MORALrrY oF LAW 77-78 (rev. ed. 1969); W. LAFAVE, ARMEST: THE DECISION
To TAKE A SUsPECr INTO CUSTODY 83-101 (1965).
6 H. HART, supra note 2, at 110-14.
7 Id. at 89.
8 Id. at 92-95.
9 Id. at 111, 113.
10 Id.
11 Id.
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haviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of
validity" 12 and this statement seems to connote officially-formulated
rules rather than popular understandings of legal prohibitions. Here,
unfortunately, for the purposes of our present inquiry, Hart fails to
pursue the point suggested by his reference to general obedience to,
rather than general knowledge of, primary rules of obligation.13 Since
a legal system will work as long as the primary rules of obligation are
generally obeyed, it is not necessary that knowledge of the official ver-
sions of those rules be widely held. If violations of official versions of
laws would be inconsistent with adherence to another set of rules,
knowledge of and adherence to the latter would suffice. Observance of
the command "thou shalt not steal" would produce compliance with
the legal prohibitions against larceny, larceny by trick, embezzlement,
burglary, and armed robbery, and knowledge of the details of these
legal prohibitions would be unnecessary. Moreover, some statutory
provisions, even in criminal law, may be designed as criteria for judg-
ing the lawfulness of past conduct without being intended to create
standards to which people would consciously attempt to conform their
future conduct. Such provisions are designed to codify moral or cus-
tomary patterns of action, rather than to create new patterns. The com-
plexities of the New York Penal Law14 suggest that some of its pro-
visions may be designed for this use. There is little likelihood that
these provisions-which will be applied in criminal prosecutions-will
be known in detail, if known at all, to most of the persons whose con-
duct is governed by them. But persons who observe patterns of moral
or customary behavior that do not violate the Penal Law will not
suffer for their ignorance; and if persons deviating from generally-
accepted norms of behavior are punished because their deviations from
those norms also constitute violations of the Penal Law, then that law
may serve a reenforcement function with respect to those norms. This
12 Id. at 113.
13 The "primary rules" that are actually operative would be those rules to which
people conform their conduct (e.g., the biblical or popular "thou shalt not steal'), whereas
the officially-formulated "primary rules" would be the official prohibitions of larceny,
larceny by trick, embezzlement, and burglary. Hart's attribution of an officially-stated form
to primary rules could have been avoided if he had equated "primary rules" with Austin's
"positive morality" (1 J. AUSTIN, LECruRS ON JURISPRUDENCE 171-72 (4th ed. 1873)) and
then used the official prohibitions of larceny and so forth as "secondary rules" with which
to evaluate the lawfulness of conduct (rather than the validity of rules) performed pur-
suant to (or in disregard of) popular morality. Such a restatement would have brought
into focus the possibilities for the infliction of undeserved sanctions inherent in a system
that punishes according to a set of rules different'from those that serve as guides to
conduct.
14 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1.00-500.10 (McKinney 1967).
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brings us back to our original dichotomy between rules governing con-
duct and rules for determining punishment, but with a clue to a par-
tial resolution of the problem as it was originally formulated: part of
the justification for judging with one "rule" conduct guided by a
different "rule" in the mind of the actor is probably that some of the
details of the officially-formulated rule may tend to excuse rather than
to entrap; that is, to restrict rule coverage rather than to enlarge it.
Knowledge of "primary rules" of obligation in their official ver-
sions is not widely shared by the lay public, but is confined for the most
part to the judges, lawyers, and officials who possess knowledge of the
secondary rules. Moreover, the popular formulations of those "primary
rules" that are obeyed may vary considerably. Although Hart's sugges-
tion that "in a healthy society [private citizens] will in fact often accept
these [primary] rules as common standards of behaviour and acknowl-
edge an obligation to obey them, or even trace this obligation to a more
general obligation to respect the constitution," 15 is true, it should be
qualified. In a healthy society private citizens will often accept rules
of morality whose observance is consistent with observance of officially-
formulated "primary rules" of obligation. A legal system that functions
as a primary motivational force imposes a greater strain upon the
methods and procedures available for disseminating information about
legal commands than is imposed by a system in which private citizens
observe (nonlegal) moral codes or practices and thereby avoid actions
violative of legal prohibitions.
We are thus brought to an initial consideration of the extent to
which limitations upon the ability of a legal system to disseminate
information about laws should affect the content of legislative or deci-
sional law. That the nexus between law content and information dis-
semination has long been recognized as a troublesome problem is
shown by a passage from Aquinas. Picking up the remarks of the ancient
philosophers0 that no legislator is wise enough to write a law that can
properly be applied to every case without exception because no legis-
lator possesses the requisite foresight, Aquinas went on to say that
even if a legislator were in fact able to foresee all of the situations
to which a given law might be applicable, "he ought not to mention
them all [in that law] in order to avoid confusion .... - Aquinas
15 H. HART, supra note 2, at 113.
16 E.g., AISroTE, Nicoi cHEAN ETHICS bk. V., § 10, in Ti BASic WoRKs OF ARIS-
TOTLE 935, 1020 (R. McKeon ed. 1941); PLATO, STATESMAN 315 (R. Klibansky & E. Anscombe
eds. 1961).
17 T. AQUINAS, SummA TnEOLOCICA pt. I-I, q. 96, art. 6, reply obj. 3, in THi PoLrrmCA
IDEAS OF ST. THOmS AQUINAS 77 (D. Bigongiari ed. 1953).
[Vol. 56:409
CONDUCT REGULATION
thus seemingly rejected any attempt by a legislator, commensurate
with this foresight, to narrow penumbral or uncertain areas surround-
ing his laws.
It is easy to concede the practical inability of a legislator to foresee
all of the situations to which a given law might be applicable; it is not
so easy to discern, if a legislator were able to foresee all of those situa-
tions, why he should not spell them out in his law. It would seem that
spelling them out in advance would eliminate rather than cause con-
fusion; certainly it would eliminate judges' confusion over unexpressed
legislative intent. Aquinas's remark would make sense, however, if what
he sought to avoid was the confusion resulting from the existence of an
"official" version of a law, known or accessible to judges, which, as a
practical matter could not be communicated in full detail to the lay
public. If the scope of the "official" and detailed version of the law
was wider than one or more of its popularly understood versions, con-
fusion would result- the bewilderment of those punished for conduct
subjectively apprehended as lawful at the time of performance. Al-
though Aquinas's distaste for detail was probably a desire to prevent
misunderstood exceptions to laws and conditions excusing noncompli-
ance with laws from subverting the influence of their prohibitions, 8
he was nonetheless referring to the "confusion" generated by laws that
existed in detailed official and undetailed unofficial versions. It is a
credit to Aquinas's perceptiveness of problems of administration 9 that
he seems to have recognized that lay confusion over the scope of a law's
prohibitions may be aggravated by increasing the detail of those pro-
hibitions because of the impracticability of effectively communicating
such additional detail to a widespread public.
That public confusion over the scope of a law cannot always be
remedied by increased verbiage also suggests the existence of a cor-
relation between methods used for disseminating information about
prohibitory laws and their substantive content.20 Laws containing de-
tailed prohibitory commands governing conduct in situations in which
18 This is suggested by the way Aquinas visualized the operation of a legal system.
He thought that an implied exception to a general prohibition ought to receive express
official confirmation before conduct pursuant to that exception took place. Id., reply
obj. 2, at 76. He thus seems to have assumed that official expressions of the applicability
or inapplicability of a legal prohibition were easily obtainable in advance of acting. Ac-
cordingly, his concern to avoid "confusion" seems to have been directed at preserving the
understanding of the more generally applicable prohibition.
19 Cf. H. SIMON, ADMINISrRATV BEHAVIOR 41 (2d ed. 1965).
20 See text accompanying notes 121 & 181-82 infra for the suggestion of a correlation
between substantive content and enforcement resources if evenhandedness and effective-
ness are accepted as governing restraints.
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people customarily do not consult with lawyers may tend to have a
relatively high rate of violation since the lawyer-function is often useful
for clarifying the application of detailed laws to the concrete problems
of the legally untrained. Such a relationship would suggest the need
for careful reflection by legislators before they adopt detailed prohibi-
tory rules requiring conduct that deviates substantially from socially-
accepted norms and customs. On the other hand, if some exceptions
or excusing conditions are, because of their detailed or technical nature,
or for other reasons, unlikely to find their way into popular versions
of the law, their encouragement of law violations-through suggesting
to potential violators the possibility of avoiding punishment by claiming
coverage of such exceptions or conditions-would be reduced.
Recognition of the difference between popular versions of laws
and their official formulations may aid in responding to another sur-
prisingly ancient 21 but still relevant question: should extraordinary
means be taken to communicate applicable laws to persons handicapped
by their social or other environmental positions in learning about them?
In some circumstances, society does indeed take extraordinary means.
Factories are required to post notices of rights granted to employees by
the Fair Labor Standards Act22 at prominent locations in order to en-
sure that the employees know of those rights.3 The Immigration and
Naturalization Service advertises on the mass media and solicits church
and community organizations' cooperation in circulating information
concerning the annual obligation of resident aliens to report their cur-
rent status and residence. 24 Again, recognition of the difference between
popular and official versions of laws as well as the frequent necessity
for verbal imprecision in laws of widespread application suggests that
21 C. ST. GERMAIN, DocTOR AND STUDENT, dialogue II, ch. XLVI, at 254-55 (17th ed.
1787), took the view that in choosing the means for promulgating a law one could ignore
impediments to learning about the law imposed by the stations in life of particular subjects.
J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 173 (2d ed.
1907), recommended that the law
employ any of the expedients which are necessary, to make sure that every person
whatsoever, who is within the reach of the law, be apprized of all the cases
whatsoever, in which (being in the station of life he is in) he can be subjected
to the penalties of the law.
Accord, L. FULtR, supra note 5, at 51.
22 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964).
23 29 C.F.R. § 516.4 (1970). See N.Y. ConES, RULES & REGS. tit. 9, § 466.1 (1969), which
requires employers publicly to post notices concerning employee rights under the anti-
discrimination provisions of N.Y. ExEc. LAw §§ 290-501 (McKinney Supp. 1970). See also
N.Y. CODES, RULES & REGs. §§ 466.2-66.4 (1969).
24 8 U.S.C. § 1305 (1964).
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initial warnings25 and opportunities to comply with them may be
especially desirable methods of administering laws among the poor
and in other subcultures where perceptions of substantive law content
may tend to deviate substantially from officially-formulated versions,
as a result both of the incidence of greater-than-normal ignorance and
the difference in cultural contexts supplying the content for value words
employed in the laws.
Here we might observe that since these initial warnings-desirable
as they are-must be administered by enforcement officials (often police-
men or social workers in the case of the poor), the apparent "law" to
many of the poor tends to coincide with a policeman's or a social
worker's view of the applicable law. They may thus be pressed to obey
"laws" that reach into, and perhaps beyond, the penumbral areas of
the "official" versions of such laws in accordance with the perceptions
of those laws and judgments about their applicability made by individ-
ual policemen and social workers. And when police and social worker
personnel change, the asserted applicability of the laws to varying situa-
tions-and, hence, the effective content of the laws for those whose
ignorance or poverty prevents challenges to those assertions-may
change with them. This situation suggests that the view of "law" held
by some of the poor may at times differ radically from that which
prevails among middle-class property owners. The important laws to
the latter concern ownership rights, landowner liabilities, and business
and commercial arrangements where "laws" tend to be highly stable
in both their official and unofficial versions. In these areas "law," official
and unofficial, approaches Professor Mishkin's symbolic fixity.26 But the
25 Cf. W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 92-94, who reports that the practice of an initial
warning is often employed by police in some contexts in which an offender is ignorant
of the legal standards applicable to him. It is interesting to compare the emerging
recognition of a need to administer an initial warning before official action in the form
of an arrest is taken against an offender of a criminal law with the long-held and
widely-shared recognition of a need to administer an initial warning before official action
in the form of a license revocation is taken against a license holder. Administrative Proce-
dure Act § 9(b), 5 U.S.C. § 558 (Supp. V, 1970); REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
c.EDrR Acr § 14, in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAws 219 (1961). Most license holders are business enterprises or professionals
and LaFave's examples of police use of an initial warning procedure involved a business-
man and an automobile driver. This may suggest that insufficient attention is being given
to the need of the poor and other subcultures for an initial warning procedure.
28 This represents "a widely-held symbol of law" as a "fixed body of doctrine im-
personally, even mechanically, applied .... " P. MISHmN & C. MORUS, ON LAW IN COURTS
84 (1965); Mishkin, The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and
Law, Foreword to The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REV. 56, 62-63 (1965).
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important legal areas to many of the unemployed poor may be loiter-
ing,27 vagrancy,28 disorderly conduct,29 stop-and-frisk laws,30 and welfare
requirements3l where, despite an arguable stability in official versions
of these laws, the "discretion" of individual policemen and social work-
ers determines the applicable law and hence the "law" perceived by
the affected poor.32 Middle-class persons may thus tend to apprehend
"law" as highly stable whereas poor persons may tend to see it as highly
dependent upon the personalities of particular enforcement officers.
II
INCOMPLETENESS IN CONDUCT STANDARDS
A. The Problem Outlined
Although people perform most of their everyday activities without
legal advice, most middle-class persons probably tend to seek a lawyer's
counsel prior to performing unusual acts of substantial importance. In
such circumstances, legal counselling mediates between abstract "official"
commands and the determination of the applicability of those com-
mands to individual situations. This permits the effective use of a
substantially higher degree of precision in laws governing those types
of conduct in which people customarily seek legal advice before acting
than in laws governing other types of conduct. Here, to the extent
that the lawyers who are consulted are themselves adequately informed,
"popular" versions of laws that differ from their "official" counterparts
no longer present a potential for harm.
Where lawyers advise individual clients on the applicability of "offi-
cial" versions of laws, the communication of legal information is facili-
tated, but there remain aspects of another communication problem (or
of its perceptual concomitant to the laws' subjects): "incompleteness" in
27 E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
28 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 66 (Supp. 1969); cf. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d
309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
29 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 272, §§ 53-54 (1956).
30 E.g., N.Y. CODE Cam. PROC. § 180-a (McKinney Supp. 1970).
31 M. HARlRINGTON, THE OTHm AMERICA 111-12 (1962) describes "hostile" administra-
tors insisting upon strict documentation of age and residency by welfare applicants who
frequently were unable to supply that documentation. Although, in Harrington's example,
the general policy of strictness was adopted by the local welfare administration rather
than by particular administrators, it suggests the variations in official policy that ap-
plicants would face in dealing with individual officials who exercise discretion in passing
upon the satisfaction of conditions for assistance.
82 See, e.g., K. DAvIs, DiSCRETIONARY JuSTICE 80-90 (1969); A. KEITH-LuCAs, DECISIONS
AouTr PEOPLE IN NEED 45-46 (1957).
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the legal commands. Thus, Professor Hart's essay3 on the impossibility
of completely defining many legal concepts echoes the classic philosophi-
cal position that legislators could not frame a law so detailed that it would
provide expressly for the resolution of every case to which it ought to
be applicable.34 Accordingly, all laws possess, in varying degrees, mar-
ginal or penumbral areas 5 in which the application of their prohibition
is possible, but uncertain. But why is this so? Why cannot a law be
framed to provide in detail for the resolution of every case falling
under it? In part, it is because the mix of factual circumstances that
will arise in some cases cannot be predicted. Many facts will not be
foreseen by the legislators. And the particular combinations of un-
foreseen facts and equities will impel solutions that would not be pre-
dictable in advance.
The best that legislators can do in many cases-especially those
that are likely to involve mixtures of factual circumstances that present
few recurring patterns-is to legislate in terms of word-referents to
community or social values, and to leave to subsequent applications
the working out of the detailed meaning of those referents as applied
to particular sets of facts. This approach is used in many licensing and
license revocation statutes.8 6 It is embodied in the prohibitions of
antitrust law37 condemning (as interpreted) "unreasonable" trade re-
straints.38 It is partially embodied in the New York Penal Law's crimi-
nal nuisance provision 9 and in that law's catch-all disorderly conduct
and harassment provisions.40 These value-referents reflect more than an
attempt to avoid the confusion between official and unofficial commands
which more detailed laws might engender; they reflect the inability of
the legislature to speak more precisely. When value-referents are applied
33 Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROCEmINGS OF THE Aius-
TOTELIAN Soc'Y (n.s.) 171, 173-74 (1948-49); cf. G. ANSCOmBE, INTENTION 59, 61 (1963).
34 Text accompanying notes 16-17 supra; cf. L. WrrrGENSTEN, PHmLOSOHICAL INVESTI-
GATIONS 88, at 41e (G. Anscombe trans]. 1953).
35 See, e.g., H. HART, supra note 2, at 123-25; Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958); cf. R. WAssmsmom, THE JUDICIAL
DEcISION 34 (1961). See also L. WrrrGENs.aN, supra note 34, 99, at 45e; id. 142, at 56e;
Waisman, Verifiability, in ESSAYS ON LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 117, 117-30 (A. Flew ed. Ist
ser. 1951).
36 E.g., N.Y. ALco. BEY. CONTROL LAw § 63(6) (McKinney 1970) (license issuance on
grounds of "public convenience and advantage'); id. § 17(3) (revocation for "cause').
"Cause" would probably refer to violation of the governing statute or of the State Liquor
Authority's rules. Cf. N.Y. CODES, RULES & REGS. tit. 9, § 53.1(n) (1970).
3T Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
38 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
39 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45 (1967).
40 Id. §§ 240.20(7), 24025(5).
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to conduct in litigation, injustice is likely to result if the referents are
construed to apply in a manner contrary to the expectations of the
parties-or contrary to the expectations of counsel if the parties sought
legal advice before acting. But this is true principally when the legal
machinery is consciously "punishing" past conduct. Thus, a business-
man who is advised by his lawyer upon the probable meaning of a
"reasonable" restraint but who is subsequently adjudged liable for
treble damages may feel unjustly treated. Antiwar demonstrators who
are advised by counsel about the probable meaning of "near" in the
federal statute prohibiting some types of demonstrations "near" a court-
house,41 but who are subsequently convicted for demonstrating too
close to the courthouse, may feel a similar injustice.
In these situations no tribunal or legal institution exists for giving
content to the law in a definitive manner in advance of performing ac-
tion that is later judged by that law.42 The problem, accordingly, re-
sults less from the legislature's failure to communicate its standards
than from the incomplete or open-ended nature of those standards.
The standards are incomplete in the sense that the norm or value
embodied in the law does not precisely specify the manner of its
application in particular cases that may arise under it. The value-refer-
ent is a delegation by the legislature to the public and to the courts
to apply (and to give meaning to) that value; and the fairness, and to
a large, if lesser, extent, the workability of that delegation depend upon
the degree to which the affected members of the public (with the as-
sistance of their counsel) and the courts attribute a consistent and
coherent meaning to that norm or value. The greater the number of
factors involved in the application of a value to a situation, however,
the greater the likelihood that the situation may be evaluated in terms
of the relevant value (such as "reasonableness") differently by different
persons.43 Emphasis on different facts, attribution of relevance to dif-
ferent factors, and misapprehension of facts all contribute to the in-
41 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (1964). The vagueness of the word "near" is offset by making
"intent" to interfere with, to obstruct, or to impede the administration of justice or to
influence any judge, juror, witness, or court officer a component of the offense. However,
any one out of many participants in a protest demonstration may find that the likelihood
of his arrest and conviction may be more likely to turn on how "near" the courthouse he
was than exactly what his own subjective intent was with respect to influencing the pro.
ceedings.
42 See text accompanying notes 83-84 infra.
43 Cj. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1952) (Jackson,
J., dissenting); Urmson, On Grading, in EssAYs ON LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 159, 174-76 (A.
Flew ed. 2d ser. 1958).
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creased likelihood that different evaluations of a complex situation may
be made by different persons. This likelihood increases whenever the
situation is not a recurring one, so that experience with a particular
mix of relevant factors in that type of situation is lacking. Thus, the
failure of perceived law to converge with officially-formulated law here
creates the same potential for injustice and inefficiency that we saw
was created by the nonconvergence of.popular and official versions of
laws.4 4 The situations differ analytically because in the earlier example
the simultaneous nonconvergence could be explained as resulting from
a failure of communication between the legislature and the affected
members of the public, whereas here the consecutive nonconvergence
results from an incomplete or open-ended standard embodied in the
law, which is completed or filled in, in relevant part, only after the
activity in question has been performed.
For sake of completeness, we must again advert to the situation
in which a law may not be intended primarily as setting forth a con-
duct standard that is expected to be correctly self-applied by the people
regulated. A reference to "reasonableness" as the governing criterion
for lawful carrier rates in a statute creating a right of action for repara-
tions exhibits an inability of the legislature to speak precisely, but in
this case the delegation is not so much to the regulated public and
the courts or other adjudicating bodies to arrive at the same inter-
pretation of reasonableness as is the delegation implicit in references
to matters such as "unprofessional conduct" in license revocation pro-
visions.45 The former statute may contemplate that the delegation is
primarily to the courts to determine "reasonableness" in an after-the-
fact proceeding. True, the court's judgment will redress a prior occur-
rence that is determined to have been inequitable only at the point
of judgment. But since the redressing merely reallocates money that
has previously changed hands without stigmatizing any party as a crim-
inal, it ought not to be viewed as involving the "punishment" of
anyone. Thus, no substantial injustice seems to result merely because
the carrier may have acted upon a conception of "reasonableness" that
differed from one subsequently determined by a court in reparations
proceedings.
44 Text accompanying notes 1-32 supra.
45 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS Ch. 112, § 71 (1965), construed in Forziati v. Board of Regis-
tration in Medicine, 333 Mass. 125, 128 N.E.2d 789 (1955) ("gross misconduct in the prac-
tice of his profession'); N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 6514(2)(g) (McKinney 1953) ("unprofessional
conduct'). The New York law contemplates the issuance of rules by the State Board of
Regents to give effect to the "unprofessional conduct" criterion.
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B. Legislative Intent and Developing Statutory Meaning
A classic approach to the application of laws that are verbally in-
complete is to search out meaning from legislative "intent." 46 It is
apparent, of course, that the conscious but unexpressed "intent" of
even a single legislator about how a given enactment would apply to
particular hypothetical problems is limited. A fortiori, the conscious but
unexpressed intent of a multi-member legislature is even more limited,
since the attribution of conscious intention to such a body may prop-
erly be made only with respect to the overlapping-or at least the con-
sistent-conscious intentions of its members.47 Accordingly, intent has
sometimes been sought in the context of enactment, in the problems
the legislature perceived, or in the "evils" it sought to reduce or
eliminate.
The context of enactment may be found in varying ways. The
legislative documents and reports may help to recreate, in the minds
of later actors and adjudicators, the legislature's view of the problems
to which it reacted. Other documents may help to recreate other con-
temporary views of those problems. But later experience and scholar-
ship may also throw additional light upon the problems with which
the legislature struggled and in some cases may furnish new guides to
statutory interpretation.48 Here again we face a potential for applying
different criteria for evaluating a defendant's conduct than those he
or his counsel perceived at the time the conduct was undertaken. Li-
brary facilities, firm size, and the general economics of law practice
40 Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (K.B. 1584) (recommend-
ing "such construction [of a statute] as shall suppress the mischief [existing before the
enactment of the statute being construed] and advance the remedy [chosen by Parlia-
ment]"); J. BENrHAM, A ComMENT ON TM CoMmENTARIEs 122-23 (C. Everett ed. 1928); cf.
T. AQUINAS, supra note 17; AasrorTLE, supra note 16.
47 The conscious, subjective intent, if one exists, of a multi-member legislature is a
composite of the individual intentions of its members. The more the legislative action
depends upon the institutional processes of government for information gathering and
evaluation, or upon scholarly or other evaluations, the more justifiable it seems to infer
that the actions of the individual legislators were predicated upon the conclusions and
recommendations of committees or specific studies. This is not nearly so true, however,
when an understanding of the problem dealt with by legislation is not dependent upon
hard-to-find information or upon the conclusions of expert analysis. In the latter case,
individual legislators may be more capable of evaluating the problem for themselves and
may be less dependent upon committee recommendations or other studies.
48 It appears that the congressional understanding of the post-World War II merger
movement-an understanding upon which the 1950 amendment to § 7 of the Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914)) was largely based-was
erroneous. See Adelman, Economic Aspects of the Bethlehem Opinion, 45 VA. L. REv. 684,
685-86 (1959); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 HAv. L. REV. 226, 232-34 (1960).
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may limit the abilities of counsel to evaluate legislative "intent" when,
for example, that intent has to be pieced together from documents that
are not easily accessible.4 9 Limitations of education, imagination, and
experience may also impede counsel's abilities fully to evaluate that
intent. More rarely, defendant's counsel may have delved more deeply
into legislative intent and its implications than it would be possible
to communicate effectively to a judge in litigation.50 In these situations,
the defendant's conduct would be judged by a "rule" different from
the "rule" to which he felt called upon to conform his action. Ideally,
in the former cases the imposition of punishment ought to be limited
by aconstruction of legislative intent that would have been reasonably
apparent to the defendant's counsel before the defendant acted. The
practical need to avoid creating exceptions and excuses, coverage of
which may be easily feigned, may prevent the legal system from recog-
nizing individual differences in that degree; and probably in most of
these situations the defendant would have known that he was taking
a risk when he acted, so that the infliction of punishment upon him
is not open to the objection that he is being punished for conduct con-
cededly proper at the time it was performed.
It is appropriate here to add a comment upon the notion of evolv-
ing statutory meaning, which has been a continuing interest of Profes-
sor Fuller.51 Fuller seems to visualize a process of law development
in which a piece of legislation suggests an incompletely-defined purpose
which, against the prevailing and developing values of the society and
its experiences, becomes progressively more articulated; and he would
attribute meaning to unclear portions of that legislation in the light of
that evolving purpose.52 Fuller's position thus seems to me to be con-
sistent with at least some of the linguistic philosophers, and it can add
a significant dimension to linguistic analysis.
Because of their focus upon usage as the criterion of word meaning,
Wittgenstein and the linguists have been accused of developing a
49 See, e.g., United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319-20 (1953) (Jackson,
J., concurring); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396-97 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
50 Counsel may be prevented from effectively communicating to a judge a complexly-
reasoned determination of the implications of legislative intent by a restriction upon
brief length imposed by custom; by the need not to discourage the judge from reading
the brief; by limitations upon the time permitted for oral argument; by the careless
manner in which the judge reads the brief; or by the intellectual limitations of the judge.
Cf. J. BENTHAm, supra note 21, at 172-75; Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29
HARV. L. REy. 622, 638 (1916).
51 L. Fu. , supra note 5, at 84-85, 145; Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law,
3 NATURAL L.F. 68, 71, 73-74 (1958).
52 L. FuLM.a, supra note 5, at 85.
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static representation of meaning in which the prior (usage) experiences
of a speaker supply and limit the meaning of his words. 58 But since
words are themselves meaningful only as means of communication,
the meaning of a word could be said to be that which is communicated
to the person to whom it is addressed. The distinction between the
speaker's meaning and the listener's meaning is significant here because
it opens the way for a dynamic approach to analyses of communication
and intention. We have already noted that a legislature's use of certain
words may embody a delegation to the courts to attribute meaning to
those words which the legislature itself did not.54 Implicit in Fuller,
however, is the recognition that this delegation is a collaborative pro-
cess between the enacting legislature and the evolving goals and values
of society, particularly as reflected in court decisions. Thus, developed
"law" is something more than a court's "interpretation" of a legis-
lative enactment even as informed by an "intent" inferred from the
circumstances of enactment. It may best be described as the product of
the interaction of the enactment and its imprecisely-defined goals with
the effects of experience and reflection that emerge from decisions ap-
plying the enactment. The obviousness of this statement ought not to
obscure the importance of giving implicit recognition, in appropriate
cases, to the essential role of court participation in a course of develop-
ment that may culminate in a "law" providing for results that would
have been inconceivable (or even shocking) to its original authors.
Clear instances in which law development surpasses conceptions that
could appropriately be ascribed to liberal views of legislative intent
derivable from the context of enactment may not be numerous, but
they exist. The Sherman Act 55 and the commerce clause56 furnish the
most obvious examples. Moreover, in a growing number of instances
the legislatures are consciously using concepts to which they attach no
clear meaning but which are intended to evolve in their applications.57
This familiar notion of evolving statutory meaning, to which Fuller
has contributed a philosophical articulation, presents again the danger
that a defendant may act pursuant to one standard of conduct and yet
later be judged by another standard-a standard that has evolved from
the former, but that is nonetheless different from it. An expected re-
sponse would be that courts attribute new content to a law every time
58 H. MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 178 (1964).
54 See text accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
55 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
56 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
57 See, e.g., J. LAoIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 68-69 (1938). See also K. DAVIS,
supra note 32, at 49.
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they apply it, for the meaning of every law is ultimately determined
by its application. But the appropriate rejoinder here is that the at-
tribution of "new" content to an existing law is a matter of degree,
and that which can sometimes be done by stages cannot necessarily be
achieved in one decision. Fuller has pointed out the essential role in
law development performed by cases raising points that serve as "doc-
trinal bridges '58 to other and different points. A conceptual jump
from A to C may appear unwarranted, and C may be judicially rejected
as not within the ambit of a particular law. But if point B arises and
extends the meaning of the governing law, the jump to C may seem
more appropriate. Thus, Fuller notes that the holding of Shuey v.
United States59 that a published reward offer could be withdrawn by
a revocation announced with publicity equal to that accorded the offer
was criticized by Pollock as "a rather strong piece of judicial legisla-
tion. 860 But, continues Fuller, given the prior case law background
holding that the revocation of a reward offer was effective when "com-
municated," suppose Shuey had been preceded by a case in which a
revocation was mailed to the offeree but remained in an unopened
envelope on his desk. The court, in such a case, would probably have
held the revocation "communicated" after the offeree had had a rea-
sonable opportunity to become familiar with it. And had the inter-
mediate case arisen and had it been decided as suggested, the result in
Shuey would probably not have elicited Pollock's criticism. 1
The scope of the logical jump from one decision to another is
especially critical in those decisions that "punish" a person for en-
gaging in unlawful conduct. Thus, the commitment of General Electric
executives to jail for engaging in price-fixing 2 could not have been
as easily justified without the prior course of decisions culminat-
ing in the "law" that price-fixing was per se illegal.63 And it is the
breadth of the logical jump from the "law" as it was previously
declared to the "law" as declared by an adjudicator in a punish-
ment proceeding that determines whether an accused had fair warning,
at the time he acted, that his conduct was proscribed. The traditional
objections to vague penal laws are based on the fear that a logical jump
58 Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REy. 429, 441-42 (1934).
59 92 U.S. 73 (1875).
60 F. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CoNTRAcT 23 (3d Am. ed. 1906); Fuller, supra note 58,
at 441.
61 Fuller, supra note 58, at 441.
62 Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1961, at 2, col. 2.
63 E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927).
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in a criminal proceeding will result in punishments being imposed
without fair warning;64 the objections to the reasserted power of the
English courts to develop common law offenses against public morality
are similarly based.65 The less precise the laws, the greater the power
of an adjudicator to make a logical jump to a result that could not
have been predicted beforehand, and thereby to punish (or to stigma-
tize as antisocial) an actor who conformed to society's demands as he
and others saw them at the time he acted. The more the existence of
such power is widely recognized, the less chance there is that actors will
be punished pursuant to criteria of legality different from those they
apprehended as possibly applicable at the time they acted; at the same
time, however, the perceived risks of a variety of legal interpretations
may expand the inhibiting scope of a law over larger areas of conduct
than are, or ought to be, socially tolerable.66
III
LEGAL PENUMBRAE AND UNCERTAINTY
A. Effects of Legal Penumbrae on Conduct
Granted that all laws possess, in varying degrees, penumbral areas
of unclarity, let us consider the likely effects of that unclarity upon
conduct. In many situations, of which the antitrust and demonstration
examples described above 67 are illustrative, binding official interpreta-
tive rulings are unavailable prior to taking action. In other situations,
declaratory procedures may be too cumbersome, too expensive, or too
impractical to be invoked, or possibly unknown to, or unconsidered
by, the actors or their counsel. 8 In such circumstances, persons subject
to a particular law must determine their own course of conduct after
considering the possible applicability of the law's prohibition to their
contemplated action.
Unless strong countervailing incentives are present, a habitual
commitment to the observance of laws containing prohibitory com-
mands, plus a fear of the consequences of violation, may induce many
64 Compare McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931), with Hall, Strict or
Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARv. L. REv. 748, 758-59 (1935).
65 See H. HART, LAW, LmERTY AND MoAs.Lrry 12 (1966), commenting on Shaw v.
Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 220 (1961).
66 See text accompanying notes 74-80 infra.
67 Text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
68 See C. HoasKy, THE WASHINGTON LAwYER 92-97 (1952); cf. J. BENTHAM, supra note
46, at 101-04.
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people to make "safe" decisions-decisions to avoid conduct falling into
the penumbral areas of prohibition. Through such decisions, the scope
of the legal prohibitions involved-as they influence conduct rather
than as criteria for evaluating past conduct in punishment proceedings
-may be enlarged to embrace substantial amounts of their penumbral
areas. Doubt about how the judiciary may later "fill in" unclear areas
of a law may tend to expand that law's operative scope as a guide to
conduct beyond the area it will occupy after the judiciary ultimately
acts. Even those laws which are not properly viewed as prohibitory but
which are designed to authorize courts or administrative bodies to re-
structure or set aside prior transactions 69 may discourage conduct that
potential actors fear will probably be restructured or set aside. And
penumbral areas of those laws will similarly (though to a lesser degree)
act to discourage activities otherwise apprehended as desirable by po-
tential actors, since the costs of later restructuring those activities or
the costs that would be incurred as a result of their later invalidation
(as well as the costs of defending challenged activities in litigation)
would tend to diminish their perceived profitability or attractiveness.
Note, then, three sources that tend to extend the inhibiting scope
of a law upon conduct: (1) uncertainty of application, which may tend
to project the law's conduct effects beyond its "core" or area of certain
application; (2) an actor's assessment (a) of the likelihood that a ques-
tionably covered transaction will be required to be restructured or
will be set aside, and his assessment of the costs of that restructuring
or rescission, or (b) of the likelihood that his performance of that trans-
action will subject him to "punishment" or other penalties, and his
assessment of the nature and amounts of those penalties; and (3) costs of
contesting an assertion by the enforcement authorities that the law
applies to the contemplated transaction. The first factor may involve
a moral impetus upon the will of an actor towards conformity with an
officially-asserted will;7 0 the second and third factors may give economic
or other coercive reenforcement to the moral impetus, but they also
carry an impetus towards compliance which is independent of the
69 In many of their more novel or doubtful applications, the federal antitrust laws
(note 79 infra) probably ought to be viewed principally as granting remedial powers to
set aside transactions that are officially determined to need rescission rather than as cre-
ating standards to which conduct is expected to conform in the first instance. Cf. Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 97 (1911), where Justice Harlan, in a separate opinion,
pointed out that criminal punishments cannot appropriately be imposed for noncon-
formity with a standard as vague as "reasonableness."
70 A person moved by such a moral impetus would be accepting the legal standard
(here expanded or contracted in scope by its uncertainty of application) as an "internal"
one in Hart's terminology. H. HART, supra note 2, at 55.
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moral question. Moreover, when the stakes are low enough relative to
the costs of conducting a defense to an enforcement action, the third
factor may tend to inhibit conduct even though no moral impetus is
felt and even though there appears little likelihood that the asserted
application of the law would be upheld on the merits if contested in
litigation.
Enlarged areas of prohibition are desirable in many cases; society
may need a safety margin 7' surrounding the prohibitions contained in
most of the common law crimes. And the perennial refusal of equity
to define fraud has been based, at least in part, upon society's need for
such a safety margin.72 That need may also have partially accounted for
the reluctance of many of the ancient and medieval philosophers to
recommend specificity in prohibitory rules.73 In some areas, however,
it may not be socially desirable for a law's operative prohibition upon
conduct to expand very far into a penumbral area of substantial scope.74
Thus, for example, although the public interest in the dissemination
of news may ultimately be progressively defined in court decisions in
libel cases, that interest may be effectively limited for many years prior
to those decisions by the restraining effects upon publishers which flow
from the uncertainties of predicting the responses that courts may make
in libel litigation.75 Accordingly, the importance of New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,76 as expressly recognized by the Supreme Court in its
opinion,77 lies not primarily in the new criteria for liability that will be
used by courts adjudicating libel actions involving political figures, but
rather in how those new criteria will work in relaxing inhibitions
previously felt by writers and publishers. And in Bantam Books, Inc.
71 Such a "safety margin" could be visualized as an area in which conduct was dis-
couraged, not necessarily because of social antipathy towards all conduct in that area,
but because, on balance, the institutions charged with defining illegality had so far
found the task of definition within that area of insufficient societal concern to justify
expending effort on it. Cf. Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
72 See, e.g., Leach v. Central Trust Co., 203 Iowa 1060, 213 N.W. 777 (1927). See also
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 nAl (1963).
73 T. AQUINAS, supra note 17; ARiSrOTLE, supra note 16; PLATO, supra note 16.
74 All laws have penumbral areas in which their application is in doubt. But the
operative prohibition of those laws would tend to extend into their penumbrae in ac-
cordance with a balance between the total detriments and the total benefits expected
from acting.
75 Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964). Bentham stated:
I think it of use to communicate some observations concerning the conduct of
affairs; but am afraid to do it, doubting, tho with the Law before me, whether
what I have to say, would or would not be deemed a libel.
J. BENTHAM, supra note 46, at 101.
76 376 US. 254 (1964).
77 1d. at 277-82.
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v. Sullivan,78 the Court gave some implicit recognition to the third
of the identified factors that tend to expand the inhibiting effect of
a law over conduct. Again, business corporations sometimes may be
dissuaded from entering into profitable sales transactions because of the
possibility that the transactions might subsequently be held to have
violated one or more of the federal antitrust laws.7 9
In other situations, however, the uncertainty of a law's application
may have a different effect. When the forces countervailing a law's
possible prohibitions are strong in comparison to the chances that
serious sanctions will be imposed for its violation, conduct in the
penumbral areas may not be discouraged. 0 Thus, for example, the
difficulties of ascertaining with certainty the application of the anti-
trust laws to a host of business practices combined with the economic
attractiveness of many of those practices mean that much activity in
the areas penumbral to those laws will occur. In short, the influence of
a law's penumbra upon people's conduct is likely to be a function of
the degrees of uncertainty that they apprehend combined with the
utility to them of conduct in the penumbral areas.
A final word about safety margins. Many laws and judicial deci-
sions may be drawn as a result of imprecise analysis. Thus, for example,
if a judge in a given case were to order the eviction of a penniless
widow in favor of a wealthy mortgagee because to do otherwise would
weaken confidence in commercial transactions generally, he would have
imprecisely analyzed the necessary precedent-effect of his action; he
could create an exception for penniless widows to mortgagee foreclosure
rights without adversely affecting confidence in all other commercial
arrangements.81 Exceptions to law, however, have their own penumbrae;
78 372 U.S. 58 (1963). In Bantam, the Court recognized that a book distributor
"who is prevented from selling a few titles [because of official objection to obscenity]
is not likely to sustain sufficient economic injury to induce him to seek judicial vindica-
tion of his rights." Id. at 65 n.6. Put another way, the Court recognized that the
economic injury suffered by the distributor in acquiescing to an officially-asserted objec-
tion to certain titles is often less than the economic costs he would incur in contesting
those objections in litigation. The Court implied that even preenforcement challenge
to the system by the distributor would be impossible for similar economic reasons.
But see International Longshoremen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954); United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
79 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964); Clayton Act, id. §§ 12-14, 19-22, 27; Federal
Trade Commission Act, id. §§ 41-58. See C. HoRsKY, supra note 68, at 90-91.
80 Cf. J. BENTHAM, supra note 21, at 172-75.
81 R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 35, at 143. The judge could logically support a
decision to evict on the ground that creating a special rule for widows would harm
the class he wished to help by making it more difficult for widows to obtain mortgages.
Id. See G. WxLLIAms, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 347 (1953), where Williams
recognizes that the "segregation from punishment" of "a defined class" will "not impair
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and if a legislator or a judge is unable to frame an exception with
precision he may decide either not to create it or to define it so nar-
rowly that the penumbral area adversely affects the exception rather
than the prohibition. The more experience a legislator or a judge has
in a given area, the more refined distinctions will he be able to draw
and the better will he be able to limit the prohibitions that he creates
to the conduct actually objectionable to him.8 2
B. The Dynamics of Legal Penumbrae
We have previously concluded that uncertainty in meaning and
uncertainty in application of legal prohibitions are likely to have con-
duct effects that are determined in large part by the economic and other
incentives or disincentives to action experienced by the persons subject
to those prohibitions. It is now appropriate to inquire how the process
of penumbra clarification may affect those incentives or disincentives,
and, accordingly, the substance of regulated activity. The more easily,
quickly, and cheaply a person may obtain a definitive ruling upon the
consequences of his contemplated action, then, all other things being
equal, the more likely is it that he will seek such a ruling before he acts.
Conversely, the more trouble, delay, and expense are involved in ob-
taining the ruling, the more will he be discouraged from seeking it.
A major reason, however, why a person may fail to obtain official
views upon the legal propriety of a particular transaction in advance
may be his reluctance to draw official attention to the transaction. 83
And this reluctance may not be based altogether upon a hope that the
transaction will be overlooked. Sometimes enforcement officials will not
react to a given transaction if they are not asked about it. Posing the
question forces them to express a view about the transaction which in
the absence of the question they would not express. Accordingly, a
person contemplating a certain transaction may decide not to solicit
an opinion from an enforcement agency because the answer might
question the legality of the desired transaction, whereas if he does not
inquire, no statement of illegality will be forthcoming from an official
source. The decision not to inquire thus preserves the uncertainty that
permits the transaction to be performed under the appearance of, or
the efficiency of the sanction for people generally." But see Hart, supra note 4, where
Hart notes that the existence of an excuse or an exception to punishment may weaken
the deterrent effect of a punishment by encouraging people to "take a chance in the
hope that they will bring themselves, if discovered, within these exemption provisions
.See also W. LAFAvE, supra note 5, at 89-91.
82 G. MILLER, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 238 (1951); c. L. Wrr NSraMN, supra
note 34, 208, at 83e.
83 See, e.g., C. HoRsxy, supra note 68, at 93.
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at least under a claim of, legality, and under a claim of adherence to
the accepted morality of obedience to laws.
Other factors also discourage persons from making inquiries of
enforcement officials about the legalities of particular transactions. En-
forcement agencies whose substantive policies are reevaluated and
modified by reviewing judicial tribunals may sometimes feel an obliga-
tion to view statutory prohibitions broadly and to rely upon subsequent
judicial review to provide the necessary correctives for their broad in-
terpretations. Asking such an agency for its opinion about the legality of
a given transaction would subject the transaction to an evaluation based
upon a broader, enforcement-oriented view of statutory policy rather
than to a possibly narrower view of that policy which might ultimately
be obtained from a court. An aura of illegality, which would have been
absent were no such question asked of the agency concerned, might thus
infect the contemplated transaction. Also the rendering of an opinion by
an agency may commit that agency to enforce its opinion. s4 Accordingly,
the soliciting of an opinion from an enforcement agency may heighten
the possibility that a proposed transaction will be officially attacked.
The above considerations tend to encourage potential actors to
avoid taking steps to remove those existing states of uncertainty that
are conducive to the actions they desire to perform. The prospect that
a contemplated transaction may be set aside or undergo forced modifica-
tion if attacked by an enforcement agency, however, creates a counter-
vailing impetus to obtain that agency's view of the contemplated trans-
action. Strengthening this impetus are the costs likely to be incurred
if the transaction is subsequently set aside or modified and the likeli-
hood that the enforcement agency's policies will be upheld in court.
Also conducive to seeking advance agency approval are the prospects
of delay, harassment, and expense that a hostile enforcement agency can
impose.
Another important factor in the decision of an actor to seek (or not
to seek) advance approval for a proposed transaction is his assessment
that if the transaction in its contemplated form is not approved, it can
nonetheless be adapted relatively inexpensively to a form that will meet
with official approval. Moreover, if the transaction is so adaptable in its
84 See An Interview with the Honorable Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in Charge of the Antitrust Division, in 30 A.B.A. ANTrrrusT SECrION 100, 121 (1966).
In an analogous manner, it has been suggested that the FTC should treat its trade
regulation rules (16 C.F.R. §§ 400-19 (1970)) as not merely statements of substantive
policies but as also embodying an enforcement commitment. Baum & Baker, Enforcement,
Voluntary Compliance, and the Federal Trade Commission, 38 INANA L.J. 322, 355
(1963).
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early stages, but would not be adaptable in its later stages, then his in-
centives to seek an advance official expression will be increased. Let us
take some specific examples. Persons contemplating a merger of two
firms of moderate size which is neither clearly lawful nor clearly un-
lawful under the existing authorities 5 might make the judgment that
if the merger is attacked at all, it will be attacked either immediately
prior to its consummation or at least shortly thereafter.8 6 Acting under
such a forecast, they might assess the costs of undoing or modifying the
merger in its early stages against the disadvantages of seeking prior
clearance for the transaction from the Justice Department. 7 They
might conclude that the costs of undoing or modifying an announced
or just-consummated merger would be so great that the need to ensure
their avoidance would overcome the disadvantages (the risk of official
agency disapproval) of seeking the prior clearance. But if the costs of
undoing or modifying the merger in its early stages are not large, the
advantages to be gained from not forcing a Justice Department opinion
may outweigh the risks that the transaction may later have to be un-
done or modified.
Compare, however, the case of a sustained advertising campaign or
of the development of a trade name. If the views of enforcement agen-
cies about the lawfulness of the campaign or trade name are available
to the firm concerned before it has committed a substantial and un-
recoverable investment to the campaign or trade name promotion, it
has strong incentive to seek out those agency views so that it can, if
necessary, modify its advertising campaign or its choice of a trade name
to conform to the agency's views of lawfulness. Otherwise, the firm risks
a later imposition of the agency's views which may be much more bur-
densome than an early modification. 8 The litigation over the Mary
Carter Paint Company's advertising and promotional practices, under
which that company established retail paint prices on a per-can basis
but publicized that it furnished a second can "free," is a case in point.89
85 The area of doubt about Justice Department enforcement policy has been reduced
as a result of the issuance of the Department's Merger Guidelines. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Merger Guidelines (May 30, 1968), in 1 TRADE REG. Ra'. 4430 (1968).
86 Compare United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957)
(stock acquisition in 1917-19 period determined illegal 40 years thereafter), with Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 623-24 (1953) (consideration of
long-tolerated trade arrangements held relevant when "monopolistic purpose rather than
effect" was being gauged).
87 See text accompanying note 84 supra.
88 Cf. Gellhorn, Declaratory Rulings by Federal Agencies, 221 ANNALS 153, 157-58
(1942).
89 Mary Carter Paint Co., 60 F.T.C. 1827 (1962), rev'd, 333 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1964),
rev'd, 382 U.S. 46 (1965).
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Had the company been able to obtain a statement from the FTC, of
the views the Commission took in the litigation before the company
had invested heavily in its continuing advertising campaign, 90 it would
have had more incentive to modify that campaign to conform with the
Commission's views voluntarily and less incentive to carry its resistance
to those views all the way to the Supreme Court.
A generalization developed from the foregoing would suggest that
an agency that communicates its standards to those persons subject to
its regulatory control before they develop strong economic incentives
to resist agency policies can implement those policies more effectively
and with less effort and expense than an agency that waits to communi-
cate its policies until such incentives to resistance are built up. And
since the development of a policy is a sine qua non to its communica-
tion, the time at or during which policy development takes place may
often be an important function of efficient and effective regulation. To
put it more simply: knowledge of agency policies which is acquired by
those subject to the agency's regulation prior to their acting tends to pro-
mote activities that conform to those policies; but knowledge acquired
after action has begun may be ineffective to offset fully the economic in-
centives engendered by the activities themselves, which tends to dis-
courage compliance with agency policies.
One conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that policy
development and implementation of new policy may be more effective
and may cost less when it is directed to the control of conduct in a
manner that tends to be prospective in fact regardless of its prospectivity
in theory. I hasten to add that the prospectivity in fact of a policy, a
rule, or a law is quite often a question of degree. An order setting the
rates of a public utility for a period of future operation may be the-
oretically prospective, 91 but a substantial divergence of the new rate
90 The company did have access to Commission objections about advertising of
"free" products. See Walter J. Black, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 225 (1953); FTC, Guides Against
Deceptive Practices: Guide V, 23 Fed. Reg. 7965 (1958); FTC Release (Dec. 3, 1953), in 4
TRADE REG. REP. 40,210 (1967). The specificity of the Commission's published statements
may have led the company to assume that the Commission would not object to the
advertising of "free" products which was not within the literal scope of those specific
objections.
From a purely economic viewpoint the company may have had an incentive to
resist implementation of the new FTC policy solely for the purpose of delay. The use
of official proceedings by private parties solely to delay the implementation of official
policies is a perversion of their proper use. To the extent possible, administration should
be carried out in such a way as to minimize the incentives for such misuse of formal
administrative and judicial proceedings.
91 Cf. Administrative Procedure Act § 2(c), 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (Supp. V, 1970); Gifford,
Report on Administrative Law to the Tennessee Law Revision Commission, 20 VMqN.
L. REV. 777, 784-85 (1967).
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from the expectations of the investors in the utility at the time they
committed their funds to it would seem to reflect a certain retroactive
aspect to the new rate order.92 Is it possible to recognize that prospec-
tivity in fact is an important element in law administration and that
prospectivity in fact is a matter of degree? Were that recognition forth-
coming, we would approach the development and application of new
policy with a slightly different orientation than we are presently in-
clined to use. An agency which subjected new conduct to a newly-de-
veloped policy but which created an exception for preexisting invest-
ment in a course of activity inconsistent with the new policy during an
amortization period9" might find its affected public more cooperative
and both the effectiveness and the efficiency of its regulation increased.
The apparent unequal treatment of persons in similar positions94
which such a course would entail might be thought to weigh against its
acceptance as a valid method of administration, but a moment's reflec-
tion indicates that a person with no or very little investment in a course
of conduct is in quite a different position from a person with a heavy
investment in that course of conduct. The grandfather clauses scattered
throughout the regulatory statutes9" illustrate an accepted differentia-
tion in the treatment of persons based upon investment committed to
an activity prior to the time at which the legislature embarked upon a
new policy affecting that activity. Administration-as exemplified espe-
cially by the Internal Revenue Service's Revenue Rulings-which ap-
plies newly-formulated policies retroactively but carves out an exception
for those who relied on prior administrative advice96 gives implicit recog-
nition to the differentiation between a theoretical retroactivity and a
retroactivity in fact. It is true that in the latter cases the differentiations
in treatment may have been based upon the felt injustice of interfering
with actors' reasonable expectations of how their conduct would be
treated officially rather than upon the interference with effective regu-
lation that would be engendered by widespread resistance to agency
policies. And it is true that resistance probably ought not in general
to be the sole factor that influences an agency against implementing
one of its declared policies. But resistance or proneness to resist may
92 Cf. J. BoNBRiGH-sT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATEs 128 (1961).
93 E.g., PHILiPPINE ANN. LAWS tit. 18, § 44 (1956) (prohibiting aliens from engaging in
retail businesses but providing a 10-year amortization period); Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 803(d)
(Supp. V, 1970).
94 See, e.g., M. GINSBERG, ON JUSTICE IN SOCIETy 7 (1965).
95 E.g., 49 US.C. § 5a (1964); id. § 306(a); id. § 909(a); id. §§ 1010(a)(2).(3); Cf. 16
U.S.C. § 817 (1964).
96 E.g., Rev. Rul. 54-172, 1954-1 Cur. BULL. 394, 401.
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also reflect committed investment; and if the investment has been made
in unexceptionable circumstances, then a proneness towards resistance
may partially coincide with circumstances in which the formulation and
immediate implementation of a new policy would, with perhaps some
definitional stretching, be described as inequitable. The points must
not be overstated. They are the narrow ones that (1) when proneness
towards resistance to agency policies is uncovered, that proneness may
partially reflect a felt injustice about the immediate implementation
of those policies; and (2) efficient allocation of agency resources requires
that choices among methods and areas for enforcement reflect informed
judgments of where expenditures of official effort will yield a maximum
of beneficial results.
C. Uncertainty as a Regulatory Device
If uncertainty about the applicability of laws sometimes extends
the operative scope of their prohibitions, it follows that uncertainty and
hence the wider operative scope of those laws will be preserved when
specific criteria governing their penumbral applications are (1) not
formulated, or (2) formulated but not disclosed. Recognition of the
effects of legal uncertainty on conduct can lead lawmaking or policy-
making officials consciously to employ that uncertainty as a regulatory
device. 97
For example, let us initially take a look at enforcement policies
and uncertainties surrounding their use. Sanctions or the threat of
sanctions traditionally have been viewed as an integral part of "law"; 98
they perform a reenforcement function for the great majority of us who
attempt to act in conformity with the laws, and they have been thought
to deter transgressions by persons taking an "external" or hostile atti-
tude towards society's laws.
We have noted that the deterrent or reenforcing function of sanc-
tions exists only to the extent that the threat of sanctions is communi-
cated to affected persons. A priori, the threat of sanctions (and hence
the deterrent or reenforcing function) will tend to vary in its impact
with the likelihood, perceived by affected persons, that the threat will
or will not be carried out. The difference between a perceived and an
97 See, e.g., L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
407-08 (1961).
98 Indeed, Austin would say that the threat of a sanction creates the "obligation"
to obey a legal command, and that without that threat the obligation is nonexistent.
I J. AUSTIN, supra note 13, at 458. See also J. BENTHAM, supra note 21, at 193; H. KELsEN,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 168 (3d ed. 1961); Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law,
50 L.Q. REV. 474, 487 (1934).
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actual likelihood suggests the first-and most justifiable-role for "se-
crecy" in law. Secrecy over enforcement policies and the deployment of
enforcement resources (and hence secrecy over the real efficacy of a law's
sanctions) can often be justified on the ground that nonsecrecy would
detract from the law's influence upon conduct. For example, informa-
tion about an enforcement agency's policy to reserve more serious
punishments for second or repeated offenses could be publicly dissemi-
nated only at the cost of reducing the deterrent effect of the threat of
sanctions for initial offenses.99 Or, were it to become public knowledge
that the police had temporarily reallocated most of their manpower to
a particular section of a city, the law's deterrence in other sections of
that city might be weakened. 10 0
The latter example suggests the general problem presented when
the number of law violations exceeds the capacity of society's enforce-
ment apparatus to detect, to apprehend, or to prosecute. In such situ-
ations, it is arguable that maximum benefit can be derived from any
given number of policemen or prosecutors (or from any fixed budget
limitations applicable to a police department or a prosecuting office)
when those officials concentrate their attention upon major or more
serious violations. But the undesirability of publicizing an enforcement
agency's practice to ignore minor violations is apparent; to the extent
that the public become aware that minor offenses are not being prose-
cuted, the threat of sanctions will cease to discourage them. Secrecy
over such a policy, therefore, may be called for. Alternatively, the police
and prosecutors might consciously devote a portion of their energies
to matters of lesser importance to maintain a facade of "complete" law
enforcement or to create uncertainty over just where enforcement re-
sources are allocated, thereby maintaining the law's threat of punish-
ment for violation. 101
99 [TMo promulgate a regulation incorporating an agency's policy to overlook,
in license revocation proceedings, minor violations of a particular character, or
to impose a penalty only for a second or later violation of a particular kind,
would encourage such violations.
1 R. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 296 n.12 (1942).
100 But cf. Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence,
67 MIcH. L. REv. 421, 434 (1969).
101 Professor Fuller, a vigorous critic of "secret laws" in other contexts, has not yet
expressed his views as to the propriety of these possible justifications for secrecy over
aspects of enforcement policies. His failure to do so is surprising since sanctions tradi-
tionally have been closely tied to law by writers and since apparent sanctions sometimes
constitute a major reason why people obey laws commanding action counter to their
individual interests. It is, of course, possible to abhor secrecy in those aspects of law
that establish standards of conduct, violations of which will be punished, and, at the
same time, to approve of secrecy over enforcement policies under the justifications raised
above. Such an approach would be based upon an obvious need to publicize standards
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In the situations described, the effectiveness of the laws-to the
extent that it depends upon the threat of sanctions-is being main-
tained by a sort of public deception: 102 the public is induced to obey
laws by the threat of sanctions that in reality either are nonexistent or
are less likely to be imposed than they appear. More accurately, per-
ceived threats of punishment for disobedience suggest official capacities
to make good those threats that may greatly exceed the capabilities of
existing enforcement institutions and may be inconsistent with the de-
ployment of the limited resources of those institutions. Withholding
information about enforcement policies applicable to a given law-or
enforcing such a law sporadically-may thus increase that law's regu-
latory scope (by enlarging its apparent sanctions)10 3 beyond what it
would be if full information about the enforcement policies with which
it is being administered were generally disseminated.
Iv
THE NExus BETWEEN ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND
NORMATIVE STANDARDS
When the meaning of a law is in doubt, persons subject to that
law may decide to avail themselves of the doubt, depending in part on
the risks of prosecution that they perceive. Indeed, prosecution policies
may be, in some situations, a prime indicator of what official enforce-
ment policies do in fact exist. Thus, for example, the failure of the
Antitrust Division to proceed against the host of requirements contracts
of required conduct if they are to be useful in promoting conduct in conformity with
these standards and the lack of a- need to publicize standards used for other purposes.
Although Professor Fuller seems to take this approach (L. FULLER, supra note 5, at 34-35,
49-51, 92), he earlier had censured "secret laws" that were not guides to conduct.
The Nazi secret laws condemning innocent people to death, referred to by Fuller in
Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630, 651-52
(1958), were not guides to conduct. Nevertheless, it was precisely the secret aspect of
those laws (as opposed to their substantive content) that Fuller isolated as indicative of
their departure from legality. See also Fuller, Governmental Secrecy and the Forms of
Social Order, in Nomos II: COMMUNITY 256, 256-68 (C. Friedrich ed. 1959).
102 The roles of deception or secrecy as devices to bring about compliance with law
or otherwise to affect conduct has received attention in discussions of utilitarian ethics.
See E. CARRTrrT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (1947); Mabbott, Punishment, 48
MIND (n.s) 152, 156-57 (1939); Melden, Two Comments on Utilitarianism, 60 PHIL. REV.
508, 519-24 (1951); Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. Rav. 3, 10 (1955).
103 Cf. J. BENTHAM, supra note 21, at 193, where it is noted that conduct is formulated
with reference to the apparent punishment associated with a law violation rather than
with reference to the real or actual punishment that would be incurred as a result of a
violation. See also 1 J. Austin, supra note 18, at 458.
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
that probably were in violation of the antitrust laws under a strict
reading of the "quantitative substantiality" test of Standard Oil Co. v.
United States (Standard Stations),10O may have indicated a Division
policy of applying that test leniently to contracting suppliers.
Of course, prosecution policies may be kept secret in order to avoid
encouraging law violations in areas where limited enforcement re-
sources are not presently directed. We have observed the circumstances
in which the legitimate concern of enforcement authorities with pre-
serving a law's deterrent effects despite their limited prosecutorial capa-
bilities was most justified: when the standard of substantive conduct to
which the public was expected to adhere was relatively clear. However,
where the substantive standard becomes less clear and prosecutorial
policies, accordingly, represent official concerns regarding the scope of
the prohibition in its penumbral areas, concealment of prosecutorial
policies also obscures the official concerns that underlie them. The re-
sult is that the uncertainty of application that permeates the penumbral
area-with its resultant variety of effects on the conduct of different
persons-is preserved. 105
Analytically intermediate between these extremes is the situation
where the substantive standards as applied are unclear and where prose-
cution policies are kept secret in circumstances in which the individu-
ally- and socially-beneficial effects of disclosure of those policies would
be outweighed by the socially-harmful effects of the deterrent shrinkage
on other transactions. The need for this kind of balancing results par-
tially from an official inability to make appropriate distinctions"8
among the various types of conduct falling within the literal scope of
the governing statute; it could be partially relieved by the enforcement
agency's enunciation of more precise conduct standards. The content
of such standards could be derived from the resolution of policy ques-
tions involved in formulating prosecutorial priorities.10 7 These priori-
ties need not themselves be disclosed; prosecution policies may evidence
official concerns with conduct, but because they may also reflect an in-
ability to proceed against clear violations of the law, their public dis-
semination is not always desirable. 108 Nevertheless, nondisclosure of
prosecution policies when substantive standards are unclear means that
however much policy clarification has proceeded within the agency
104 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949); see text accompanying notes 148-51 infra.
105 See text accompanying notes 68-82 supra.
106 Cf. Cohen, supra note 50; note 81 supra.
107 Cf. Dixon, Program Planning at the Federal Trade Commission, 19 AD. L. R v.
408, 410 (1967).
108 Cf. text accompanying notes 99-100 .supra.
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through the formulation of prosecutorial policies, the regulated public
remains in the same state of uncertainty that existed prior to the
clarification within the agency.
A. Imprecision in Enforcement Policies
An agency that has a significant policy-formulating function to
perform can seek to perform that function in the process of adjudi-
cating a relatively small number of cases. In these adjudications it can
seek to resolve questions or apparent questions of the acceptability of
conduct. This operation is, of course, the classic method by which ad-
ministrative policy making is supposed to occur: an agency challenges
certain activities and in an adjudication works out policy with respect
to those activities which it will then apply to other cases. 09 It is able to
concentrate on policy questions in the adjudication because, in the vast
majority of activity regulated by it, conduct conforms to acceptable
norms. This need not mean that detailed norms have been worked out
or that great diversity does not permeate the "acceptable" category, but
it does mean that the agency is able at least to discriminate among types
of conduct even though its notions of unacceptability may be largely
unarticulated. But if the agency's norms remain largely unarticulated
even to itself, and therefore remain necessarily unarticulated to the
public, those norms will suffice only if the behavior that the agency
would find unacceptable occurs only infrequently. 110 If activity that an
enforcement agency finds unacceptable on the basis of either ad hoc
reactions or internally-formulated conduct-evaluation standards occurs
more frequently than the agency can react against it, then agency regu-
lation becomes ineffectual.
B. Effects of Imprecision
Observe that conduct can be controlled in two ways: (1) conduct
standards can be enforced by carrying out official threats of harm to
persons who violate them; or (2) conduct can be directly controlled
109 Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-03 (1947); FINAL REPORT OF THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMITrrE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEDuRE 29 (1941).
110 Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REv. 786,
799, 815 (1967), points out the interrelationship between caseload and the degree of
precision in the "rules" used in case resolution. The author concludes that caseload
volume can be handled by a limited number of courts and judges through (in his
terminology) "quantifying" the rules; i.e., making them more precise. My thesis goes
beyond Friedman's perceptive insight by suggesting, as will be seen later, that the inter-
relationship between volume and precision has a number of facets that are connected to
the problem of allocation of enforcement resources and that (relative) degrees of rule
precision and imprecision should reflect the substantive importance of the conduct to
which the rules refer.
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through official action undoing the offensive behavior or prohibiting its
repetition. For purposes of discussion, the first method will be described
as "punishment" and the second as "restructuring." Official restruc-
turing of a transaction, however, may itself be burdensome to the
person whose conduct is restructured. When any significant amount of
investment has been committed to a course of conduct that is later
officially restructured, the actor may suffer substantial economic harm
if his investment is largely unsalvageable. Accordingly, the prospect of
economic or other harm from a restructuring proceeding may itself take
on a "punishment" role; it may discourage conduct deviating from a
standard in the same way that "punishment" does. Persons are thus
encouraged to conform to restructuring standards-to use them as con-
duct guides-much as they are induced to conform to a standard
backed by an official threat of "punishment." Restructuring standards
further take on the role of conduct guides when transactions that are
found in need of official restructuring are described as in "violation"
of the law or legal standard authorizing the restructuring. This formula
-frequently used in connection with cease-and-desist orders-encour-
ages affected persons who possess an internal allegiance to law to at-
tempt to comply beforehand with a restructuring standard.
Although the standard of conduct that official threats of punish-
ment are designed to encourage must be known for those threats to be
effective (and hence "rational" in the sense of constituting an effective
means to an end), restructuring can "rationally" be employed both where
the applicable conduct standards are known outside the enforcement
agency and where they are not. Naturally, where they are unknown,
conduct cannot intentionally be made to conform to them and the bur-
den of ensuring compliance with those standards falls entirely on the
officials charged with restructuring deviant transactions. But it would
be rare indeed for restructuring standards to be entirely unknown.
Rather, like other legal standards, they would in some degree lack
precision; to that extent, they would be open to development and con-
sequently "unknown" in varying degrees. When official policies are
publicly unclarified, however, lawyers are encouraged to feel that the
resolution of questions of doubtful legality is the responsibility of en-
forcement institutions and that, therefore, doubts about what the ap-
plicable substantive legal "norms" (for example, imprecisely-worded
statutes, regulations, or judicial decisions) mean for a client's con-
templated conduct can properly be resolved by the client in favor of
his individual interests. The client would be advised of the doubt and
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he would then decide among his alternative conduct choices, weighing
in the process a risk of official attack.
This procedure is not necessarily objectionable where the conduct
involved occurs in a statutory penumbral area of relatively narrow
scope and where the conduct in question does not have significantly
antisocial consequences. It may be especially common where official at-
tack would take the form of "restructuring" rather than of a "criminal"
sanction or other overt official "punishment." Advice by a tax attorney
pointing out statutory ambiguities resolvable in his client's favor would
seem to be a commonplace example. Here, the official concern seems
not necessarily to be to "correct"1 '1 every case in which officialdom
would disagree with the client's resolution of the doubtful question, but
rather to ensure that the "core" meaning of the statute is complied
with, and perhaps gradually to clarify policy in penumbral areas as well.
Where the "penumbral" or publicly-doubtful areas invade much of
the statutory prohibition, however, as was the case, for example, with
antitrust in past years, 1 2 this procedure seems to assume in enforcement
institutions unlimited abilities to perceive and to evaluate (or at least
to react to) substantially all transactions that are questionable under
existing publicly-known criteria of evaluation. This assumption may
sometimes be at odds with the real capabilities of those institutions.
In the situation described, the actors accept a risk of later official
attack. Their decisions are made, accordingly, in the light of the risks
and their consequences. Such a focus by actors upon the risks of official
111 Since the "penumbral" area is the area of doubtful applicability, the doubt in
the statute's applicability may arise because official policy has not yet been made at the
higher levels of administration. Accordingly, the concern of the higher-level officials could
not be to "correct" every case if those officials lacked a criterion for correction and the
time to develop one. There could be an official concern that every case be "corrected" by
lower-echelon staff members, but this would assume that the "correction" is to be made
by those lower-level officials regardless of the criteria used. The test of appropriateness of
all tax decisions then becomes their conformity with the views of lower-echelon officials
unless and until those officials are overruled by their superiors. Such a state of affairs
would place more emphasis on the person of the decision maker than on the content of
the decision, and becomes incomprehensible to third persons in situations where lower-
echelon officials make unreversed but inconsistent tax policy decisions in identical cases.
Cf. 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw TREATISE § 4.10, at 89-91 (Supp. 1965).
112 Antitrust law has been notoriously vague in years past, largely because of its
"rule of reason" approach to most problems. Hence, I have been able to extract a number
of examples of the effects of uncertainty from antitrust law for use throughout this
article. Within recent years the precision of the governing criteria has significantly in-
creased as the categories of per se and presumptively per se offenses have been expanded
and refined. The recent Merger Guidelines appear to have added immeasurably to the
precision of rules governing enforcement policies. Note 85 supra.
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attack recalls Professor Hart's dichotomy of "external" and "internal"
rules: 113 apprehension of prosecution rather than internal assent tends
to govern conduct in the penumbral areas of a statute's application.
But the "external" aspect may be present even more than is suggested
by the Hartian dichotomy: to the extent that precise substantive stan-
dards are lacking, an enforcement agency is in effect allocating to itself
the determination of legality in individual cases. To the extent that
precise substantive standards are lacking, the "rationality" of its punish-
ment proceedings becomes open to question, and restructuring becomes
the appropriate vehicle for conduct control. But to that very extent,
regulation tends to cast a significant burden on the enforcement or
regulating agency concerned.
When standards employed in punishment or restructuring pro-
ceedings are known in advance, regulated persons can attempt to com-
ply with them, thereby rendering official enforcement action unneces-
sary. To the exent that they are unknown, however, regulation, from
the viewpoints of the subjects of regulation, then becomes "external":
those whose conduct is regulated cannot observe standards of which they
are ignorant; an "internal" acceptance and adherence to a standard of
legality is therefore not possible for them. Retention within an enforce-
ment agency of the responsibility to determine the legality of particular
transactions shifts the burden of law observance to the agency and, in
a substantive area in which much activity is taking place, shifts it with
a vengeance. Decision making, which under relatively precise normative
standards would be performed by many individual persons or firms,
must now be undertaken by the same relatively small group of agency
officials. Common sense indicates that if these officials attempt to evalu-
ate each case individually and in depth for its ultimate social worth,
only a small number of cases will be evaluated. This in turn means that
many cases that would be disapproved in an agency evaluation will go
unreviewed and unchallenged. Agency policy will then appear erratic
and arbitrary.
C. Partially-Developed Standards
An agency may develop and disseminate substantive standards
which are precise enough for self-application in some cases but which
remain unadaptable for self-application in the bulk of cases to which
they pertain. (Or substantive standards furnishing an effective guide to
conduct for a substantial number of cases, for a majority of cases, or for
an overwhelming number of cases may be developed and disseminated.)
113 H. HART, supra note 2, at 55-56, 86-88.
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To the extent that the standards do not furnish a self-applicable guide
to conduct, however, the enforcement agency is reserving to itself the
responsibility for determining legality114 and hence must necessarily
accept the consequence that situations that cannot be reviewed or are
not reviewed by it will be governed by forces other than its own in-
dividually-oriented evaluations. Whenever a rule or standard is adopted
which, as applied to the facts of a given case, is imprecise enough to
allow for varying interpretations, the actors will tend to balance the
economic profitability or other attractions of acting against the chances
of incurring the burdens of prosecution. Here the critical question be-
comes: are the resources of the enforcement agency adequate to correct
such "externally"-made decisions where they have socially-undesirable
consequences? It now becomes apparent that there is a relationship be-
tween the degree of precision in official policy, which results in a given
allocation of the burden of law observance between the public and the
enforcing agency, and the resources" 5 that are available to the agency
to fulfill the burden thereby placed upon it.
1. Effects of Combining Precise and Imprecise Standards
Standards are not only infinitely variable in the degree of precision
with which they are formulated, but it is possible to combine standards
of varying degrees of precision. Thus, in United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank," 6 the Supreme Court adopted a presumption that any
horizontal merger resulting in the aggregation in one firm of thirty
percent of the relevant market was illegal" 7-a relatively precise stan-
dard. Mergers involving less than an aggregate thirty percent market
share were left to be governed by the preexisting and less precise
standards. 1"8 Here the relationship between the (relatively) precise and
imprecise standards determines the division between conduct that is
basically regulated by self-applications of officially-formulated standards
and conduct that is allocated to individual decisions within residual,
114 The enforcement agency reserves to itself the responsibility for determining
legality if it feels free to remake or to "correct" decisions initially made in the penumbral
areas by private persons.
115 The deployment of limited resources available to government instrumentalities
has received increasing attention in recent years. See, e.g., Smithies, Conceptual Framework
for the Program Budget, in PROGRAm[ BUDGETING 2, 19 (D. Novick ed. 1964-65); Dixon,
supra note 107. See also W. LAFAvE, supra note 5, at 144-45; Developments in the Law-
Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1099-1101 (1967); Note, Program Budgeting
for Police Departments, 76 YALE L.J. 822 (1967).
118 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
117 Id. at 364-65.
118 Id. at 365 nA1.
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officially-created boundaries. Hence mergers involving less than thirty
percent of the relevant market were, under the Philadelphia Bank ap-
proach, left initially to individual judgment, guided by the "rule of
reason" and prior decisions, but the outer boundary of the area allo-
cated to individual decision lay at the thirty percent figure.1 19 Control
within the limits of the area to which the imprecise standard applied
was primarily allocated to individually-oriented Justice Department or
FTC actions.
In such situations the question whether official resources are ade-
quate to engage in the requisite amount of individually-oriented exer-
cises of control is crucial. At the time the Justice Department was
operating with the Philadelphia Bank presumption, a legitimate ques-
tion existed as to whether the Department resources were adequate to
evaluate individual cases and to challenge the more obnoxious mergers
involving less than thirty percent of the relevant market. If they were
not, consideration should properly have been given to moving the
presumptively illegal figure downward; but then the further question
would have arisen-whether a move of the presumptively illegal stan-
dard downward would more effectively discourage the socially-obnox-
ious mergers only at the expense of discouraging a disproportionate
number of socially-beneficial ones. The Merger Guidelines120 issued
by the Justice Department resolved these conflicting considerations in
favor of a substantial lowering of the presumptively illegal figure.
2. Effects of Reserved Power To Grant Exceptions
The converse regulatory situation exists where an enforcement
agency reserves to itself an affirmative power to approve transactions
otherwise forbidden. Again a relation between the substantive content
of regulation and enforcement agency resources emerges. A hypothet-
ical case will be illustrative. Suppose a rule'21 of the FTC were to ban
those vertical mergers in the cement industry resulting in the acquisi-
tion by a cement company of any firm that regularly purchases 50,000
119 The only prior Supreme Court decision under amended § 7 of the Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914)) was Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), which, although it attributed substantial importance to
an aggregation of five percent control in finding a horizontal merger inconsistent with
§ 7 (id. at 343-44), nonetheless seems to have taken a "rule of reason" approach to
evaluating the legality of the merger.
120 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (May 30, 1968), in 1 TRADE REG. RaP.
4430 (1968).
121 Although the rule discussed in the text is modeled, in part, upon an FTC enforce-
ment policy, I have substantially altered the content of the actual rule for the purposes of
my illustration. Cf. FTC Release (Jan. 17, 1967), in 1 TRADE RaG. RaP. 4510 (1968).
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or more barrels of cement annually. Assume further that the Commis-
sion has reserved to itself the right to grant exceptions to this general
prohibition. Such an arrangement would probably be based on the fol-
lowing premises: (1) although the 50,000-barrel rule would probably
deter some socially-desirable mergers, that unfortunate effect is more
than offset by the salutary effect of the rule in preventing many socially-
undesirable mergers; and (2) the reserved power of the Commission to
grant exceptions to the rule mitigates some of the harshness with which
the rule would otherwise deal with socially-desirable mergers. But this
is a critically incomplete statement of the regulatory consequences of
the rule and the exception-granting mechanism. A third important
aspect of the arrangement is the obverse of (2): those mergers that are
not or cannot be reviewed by the Commission will be barred by the
rule. The deficiency, if any, in the procedural arrangement depends
upon an assessment of the social consequences of the Commission's
limited capacity to review. Are too many socially-desirable mergers de-
terred by the general rule because the Commission lacks the resources
to perform an effective reviewing and exception-granting function?
Asking this question sharpens our focus upon the relation between
the type of substantive regulation attempted and the available resources
that the exception-granting agency can bring to bear on individual ap-
provals.
The technique of coupling a general rule with a reserved ex-
ception-granting power has been successfully employed by a number
of federal agencies. The point is, however, that the exception-granting
mechanism imposes a cost (in manpower and budget terms) upon the
administering agency, and the ability of the administering agency to
bear that cost in combination with other and competing demands upon
its resources must be acknowledged. Sometimes the cost imposed by the
exception-granting mechanism is lower than the cost of other alterna-
tives available to an enforcement agency, sometimes it may be the lowest
cost alternative that does not unduly burden the general or the regu-
lated public, and sometimes that cost may be easily absorbed in the
costs of day-to-day administration. In United States v. Storer Broadcast-
ing Co., 22 FPC v. Texaco, Inc.,123 and American Airlines, Inc. v.
CAB, 24 the technique was employed in connection with license-grant-
ing policies or policies affecting the rights of licensees; it reduced the
supervising agency's workload by reducing the number of individual
hearings that the agency otherwise would have been required to hold.
122 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
123 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
124 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 US. 843 (1966).
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Where licenses cannot be denied except after hearing, the agency
is always burdened with the duty of holding hearings prior to negative
decisions. A rule embodying a generalized non-issuance policy saves
agency time, even where an exception-granting power is contained in
the rule. A prohibitionary rule, however, makes hearings unnecessary
where the rule is observed, whereas a reserved exception-granting power
recreates a hearing burden that the prohibitionary rule alone would
have avoided. Thus, it is at least possible that in some cases the costs
of administering an exception-granting mechanism will be a significant
administrative burden. And when the administrative costs of deter-
mining whether to grant or to deny applications for exceptions tax
the capacities of the supervising agency, the most visible symptoms may
be delayed approvals and a backlog of cases. Delays, coupled with
whatever expenses are entailed in applying for and obtaining an ex-
emption decision, may themselves discourage potential exemption
applicants from applying. The burden of handling a large caseload in
such circumstances thus ultimately falls on the regulated public who
must bear the delay.125 Crystallized exemption decisional policies, of
course, ease the administrative burden of exemption decision making
in the same way that crystallized prohibitionary policies or rules ease
the burden of enforcing prohibitions.
D. Resource-Conserving Effects of Precise Standards
In the preceding pages it has been suggested that the effectiveness
of regulation is dependent upon the sufficiency of official resources to
proceed individually against transactions not prima facie acceptable
to the governing agency under its formulated conduct standards or its
unarticulated attitudes. It has also been suggested that the need for
individual ad hoc actions will increase to the extent that officially-
promulgated conduct standards lack precision. When an imbalance
occurs between the agency's resources and the volume of transactions
requiring its individual evaluation and action, regulation tends to lose
its effectiveness. In such circumstances the agency must find ways to
change prima facie questionable or offensive conduct into prima
facie acceptable conduct. One method, of course, is for the agency,
by hardening its sensibilities, to find less conduct questionable or of-
fensive; that is, to modify its norms of (substantive) acceptability to
125 In the merger example, substantial delay and uncertainty over the result might
interfere with merger negotiations based upon stock-values if price changes upset agreed-
upon exchange ratios (although a vertical merger might be m ore likely to survive a period
of delay and doubt than horizontal or conglomerate merger attempts where the merging
companies may have no continuing economic tie with each other).
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conform to its own capacity for individual evaluation and individually-
oriented corrective action. A second approach is for the agency to
articulate with greater precision, at least to itself, the types of conduct
it finds objectionable. 126 This would enable it to formulate for its
own use a scale of priorities concerning expenditures of its available
resources of manpower and money.127 It would then at least expend
its individual evaluations on the more important matters.
Communication of the agency's more precise formulations to its
regulated subjects would enable them to conform their behavior to
those formulations; this, in turn, would further free the agency to deal
individually with conduct falling outside the articulated zone of accept-
ability and help to reduce the imbalance between the agency's en-
forcement tasks and the resources available to it for accomplishing
them. But the articulation of precise standards has a further resource-
conserving impact. By narrowing or simplifying the issues in enforce-
ment proceedings, such articulation may both shorten the proceedings
and ensure greater certainty in their outcomes. These effects of precise
standards would tend to inform the agency's constituents of the in-
creased likelihood of corrective or punitive enforcement action; this,
in turn, would tend to increase their incentives to comply with the
reformulated policies.
E. The Role of Private Economic Incentives
The troublesome nature of imprecise standards, from the view-
point of enforcement authorities, tends to increase in proportion to
the size of the economic stake of the person affected by their imple-
mentation. The higher the economic stakes, the greater the impetus
in regulated persons towards resolving the uncertainties of standard
application in favor of the course of action to which they are otherwise
committed. Moreover, high economic stakes are a strong incentive to
litigate every doubtful issue in an enforcement proceeding. If, as is
likely with an imprecise standard, such issues are many, the litigation
burden borne by a supervising agency in an enforcement suit is sub-
stantial.128 Finally, the temptation (engendered by high economic stakes)
to delay enforcement by forcing doubtful issues to litigation129 is of-
fered a fertile field for exploitation by the multitudinous issues often
126 This is the route suggested by Friedman in his notion of "quantified" rules. See
note 110 supra.
127 See Dixon, supra note 107. See also note 115 supra.
128 See, e.g., McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation,
64 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1952).
129 See notes 80 & 88-97 and accompanying text supra.
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spawned by an attempted application of imprecise standards. Accord-
ingly, the application of imprecise standards to circumstances in which
high economic stakes engender increased resistance to agency policies
aggravates the resource-draining effect of voluminous enforcement
suits. 130
One solution, as we have seen, is to clarify the governing stan-
dards,131 but another is to see that the scope of the prohibition is no
wider than necessary to achieve official goals. 3 2 If a prohibition is
unnecessarily wide, it may rule out alternative ways of reaching the
same goal, some of which would be compatible with official policy.
A private party faced with official hostility on one course of action
will look for alternative routes. If these are open to him, the path of
least resistance is to seek the alternative to which the enforcement
agency does not object. Litigation is thus avoided, enforcement agency
resources are conserved, and official policy is observed.
Consider the case of a sustained advertising campaign. A relatively
narrow objection to a proposed promotion-for example, to the use
of the word "free" to characterize a second can of paint when two cans
are sold for a single price133---can be met by a seller without a great
deal of inconvenience as long as he learns of the official objection
in time to mould his advertising campaign to avoid the objectionable
phrase. But an official objection to, say, sustained advertising campaigns
in general, 34 leaves the seller with no easy alternative courses by which
to seek his business goals. The private party, seeing no easily available
substitute course of action, is more likely to resist the policy implementa-
tion directed at him and to force it to litigation. An enforcement burden
is thus imposed on the agency which, if official goals had been properly
clarified and narrowed, might have been avoided. In the same vein, ef-
fective utilization of official resources ought to encourage compliance
with officially-asserted policies by removing all unnecessary disincen-
tives to compliance. 13 5
130 Enforcement suits are costly in the antitrust field where the issues are often many
and the cases complex. See the cost estimates of FTC enforcement proceedings in 209
BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., at A-9 (July 13, 1965).
131 Text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
132 Analogously, the insistence of the FTC upon a broad, all-encompassing order
would be likely to discourage the acceptance by respondents of consent orders. Compare
FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 868 US. 360, 367-68 (1962), with FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343
U.S. 470, 473-74 (1952).
133 Notes 89-90 and accompanying text supra.
134 Perhaps on the rationale that long-term advertising campaigns increase the
barriers that would be faced by a newcomer to the market.
135 See, e.g., Archer, Relationships Between Government Enforcement Actions and
Private Damage Actions: The Defendant's View, 87 A.B.A. ANsusT LJ. 828, 837, 842
(1968).
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Precisely-drawn and generally-applicable substantive standards-
necessary for self-application by many regulated persons-and prohibi-
tions that are sufficiently limited in scope to encourage private compli-
ance with official demands are not necessarily incompatible imperatives.
As the advertising example illustrates, a narrow and precisely-drawn
prohibitory rule can be formulated which will contain the official ob-
jections and yet will be sufficiently narrow to avoid bringing within
the scope of its prohibition other and unobjectionable types of adver-
tising.136 Such a rule could be self-applied without recourse to official
help, and because of the limited scope of the rule, the balance of
economic incentives would tend to favor compliance. 87 Moreover,
when a goal of precisely-drawn substantive standards does tend to con-
flict with needs for individual adjustment, the two objectives sometimes
can be reconciled by the use of a precise prohibition combined with
an exception-granting mechanism, although this mechanism, as we have
seen, has its problematic aspects.' 8
F. Other Effects of Imprecision
Several tendencies connected with imprecise formulation appear
also to be fostered by the permeation of conduct standards by issues
that are largely "factual" in nature. Although every attempted appli-
cation of a legal standard depends upon the facts to which the standard
is sought to be applied, the present discussion assumes that the applica-
tion of some standards requires a greater "factual" investigation than
others. 39
The effects of substantive standards whose formulation is relatively
imprecise or whose application is permeated by factual issues are sev-
186 See text accompanying note 133 supra.
137 See text accompanying notes 85-97 supra.
138 See text accompanying notes 121-24 supra.
139 Matters are "factual," for purposes of this discussion, when many issues must be
determined in order to ascertain whether the allegedly applicable legal standard applies.
This will frequently, but not invariably, be the case when the issues are "facts" of a low
level of abstraction. Thus, for example, such close-to-life facts as who said what to whom,
the detailed context in which statements were made, and background personal relation-
ships are frequently involved in the issues presented to the NLRB. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950), vacated & remanded, 340 U.S. 474
(1951). Compare the "factual" issues involved in assessing the legality of a corporate
merger under the antitrust laws. Here the relevant "facts" are often the percentage share
of the market that the merged firm would possess and the percentage shares possessed by
other firms in the industry. Such "facts" are of a highly abstract kind and their use as
decisional criteria permits ignoring less abstract facts similar to those confronting the
NLRB.
Because "factuality," like "precision," is a matter of degree, the most that can be
achieved in an analytical discussion of general scope is to elucidate tendencies rather than
specific effects.
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eral. First, the determination of what constitutes a violation is obscured
and prosecutorial omissions of the enforcement agency are no more
visible than offenses that have not been prosecuted. 40 Accordingly, it
will not always be apparent that the enforcement agency has selected
only one respondent out of may in t a cr-um -nes4
prosecution since the delineation of the relevant circumstances will
depend either upon the standards for agency action, which are im-
precise, or upon the availability of testimony and witnesses, which varies
from case to case. These contingencies tend to free an enforcement
agency somewhat from external pressures to be consistent in its choice
of respondents. Second, the relative invisibility of agency nonenforce-
ment which is a consequence of imprecise standards and "factual"
issues supports the enforcement agency's image to the public as a
generally effective governmental instrumentality. 42 Third, the agency's
credibility as an effective enforcement instrumentality may be pre-
served in the eyes of those subject to its regulation for the same reasons.
Fourth, imprecise standards may be used by the agency or its officials
to affect conduct in areas in which the agency is not prepared to com-
mit substantial staff resources to enforcement proceedings. Thus, with
a minimal expenditure of resources an agency or its officials may, by
threatening suit or by relying on the uneven deterrent effect produced
by an unclear prohibition, consciously use the uncertainty of a legal
prohibition's bounds to discourage conduct in areas penumbral to it. 43
The first effect-freeing an agency from external restraints against
inconsistency-is largely a negative value. Consistency is, and always
has been, a goal of law and of its administration.'44 The second effect
is also a negative one; the public should not be deceived into believing
that its enforcement agencies are more effective than they in fact are.
An undeserved public satisfaction with enforcement agencies may deny
those agencies the funds and other resources that would make them
truly effective. The values of the third effect seem mixed. Impressing
regulated persons with the general effectiveness of an enforcement
140 Cf. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 551-54 (1960).
141 The FTC's selection of one out of a group of several apparently identical of-
fenders appears arbitrary when enforcement criteria are unknown. See FTC v. Universal-
Rundle Corp., 387 US. 244 (1967); Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 US. 411 (1958); cf.
K. DAvIs, supra note 32, at 224.
142 Cf. Goldstein, supra note 140, at 552.
143 Since it is not forced to follow a consistent enforcement policy, the agency may
carry out threatened litigation against a few respondents without committing itself to
proceed against all similarly situated persons.
144 See, eg., M. GINSBERG, supra note 94.
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agency is not necessarily desirable, although it is of value that each
regulated person perceive an effective enforcement mechanism in the
particular areas in which he contemplates acting. The fourth effect-
extension of regulatory control into penumbral areas without substan-
tial expenditures of enforcement resources-requires some analysis.
An enforcement threat implied in the margins of a hazily-defined
prohibition or command is, as previously noted, likely to exert uneven
deterrent effects upon conduct: among people in similar situations,
combinations of subjective strict or narrow interpretations of the pro-
vision and of varying incentives to action may produce divergent be-
havior. Although the governing agency could reduce this unevenness
by clarifying its prohibitions or commands, a cost-benefit approach
to the use of higher-echelon agency time would suggest that high-level
agency officials should devote their time to policy clarification in ac-
cordance with a priority of importance, one indicator of which would
be the number of transactions that would be affected by the policy
clarification. 145 The more conduct tends to fall into recurring patterns,
the greater the impact policy clarification can have upon conduct, and
the greater the claim it can have on the scarce time of high-level
officials. Conversely, the time of high-level officials may not be most
effectively employed in clarifying policies in areas where conduct does
not fall into recurring patterns and where, therefore, policy clarification
would tend to have little regulatory impact in terms of the number
of transactions affected.146
Although recurring patterns of activity facilitate clarification of
conduct standards, which, in turn, increases the supervising agency's
power to affect or to control conduct, the impetus towards clarification
is reduced to the extent that clarification will not aid the agency in
its regulatory task. Thus, the absence of precise standards in areas of
recurring patterns of conduct may not indicate agency satisfaction with
prevailing patterns, but rather that antisocial conduct is not, in the
agency's eyes, occurring on a large scale. The latter indication is
significantly different from agency approval of existing conduct pat-
terns, because it means that the absence of agency clarifying action may
be based upon toleration of conduct patterns that are divergent or
inconsistent, as long as no large-scale antisocial conduct is perceived.
145 See Gifford, supra note 91, at 785.
146 This, in turn, raises the question why, if policy clarification is not likely to affect
much conduct, would an agency maintain a rule or a particular part of a rule whose
effects are minimal. The basic answer seems to be a combination of agency ignorance about
the actual conduct-affecting impact of the rule and a reluctance to discard a rule until
more is learned about its impact.
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Take, as an example, a state statute prohibiting "discrimination"
in employment. Some persons conceivably may read that statute as
requiring affirmative action by employers to find and to hire members
of minority groups. Others may read it as requiring employers merely
to accept or to reject applicants without regard to race. Suppose some
employers are in fact making affirmative efforts. An enforcement agency
which, in these circumstances, does not clarify the meaning of "dis-
crimination" indicates, by its silence, its belief that the aggregate
effects of existing hiring practices are not generally opposed to the
goals of the antidiscrimination legislation. Its silence, however, is con-
sistent with a view: (1) that some overall affirmative effort is needed
to employ minority persons, although not necessarily by each employer;
(2) that as long as minority employment is rising, no policy decision
on the meaning of the statutory term need be made; (3) that the statu-
tory purpose ultimately will require affirmative efforts by every em-
ployer, but not now; or (4) that the statute does not require affirmative
hiring efforts by any employer. Here, policy clarification is not neces-
sary to achieve the statutory goals, and the statute remains ambiguous.
In the example, the current divergence of employer hiring practices
would probably not be eliminated by the agency's breaking its silence,
since any employer's failure to take affirmative action would probably
not be due to his interpretation of the ambiguous statute but to the
absence of immediate sanctions for such failure.147
In other cases, where diverse conduct patterns would be attribut-
able to varying statutory interpretations, it is the responsibility of the
enforcement agency to clarify the situation by removing the statutory
ambiguity. Antitrust law furnishes an example in the Standard Sta-
tions14s condemnation of requirements contracts on a test of "quanti-
tative substantiality." Some suppliers may have read that test as out-
lawing all requirements contracts involving large amounts of commerce.
147 Such statutes generally would penalize an employer who interpreted his statutory
obligation narrowly only after the contested issue was resolved against him in a rule or
cease-and-desist order and he refused to comply with his now-clarified statutory obligation.
See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1426 (West Supp. 1970); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 9
(Supp. 1969). N.Y. Exac. LAw § 297 (McKinney Supp. 1970) allows some policy making in
a damage proceeding. Since no penalty would attach until the scope of his statutory
obligation had been clarified, an employer opposed to making affirmative hiring efforts
would have no incentive to do so prior to such clarification by the enforcement agency.
In the example in the text, the agency's silence is explainable on one of the grounds
(1)-(4). Disclosure of any one of these policy positions by the agency would not compel any
particular employer to make affirmative hiring efforts. Nor would such disclosure dissuade
any employer from abandoning affirmative hiring efforts since no more risk would be
entailed in abandoning than in failing to undertake affirmative hiring efforts.
148 Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949).
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Others may have confined the scope of the prohibition by focusing
upon the strategic location of the outlets149 involved in the Standard
Stations case and upon the oligopolistic position of the supplier.150
The general silence of the Antitrust Division and the FTC in the face
of varying interpretations of the case did not indicate endorsement of
any particular interpretation, but only administrative satisfaction that
aggregate requirements contract activity throughout the economy was
not so severely restraining competition as to justify the substantial
diversion of agency resources from other regulatory tasks to policy
clarification in this area. As in the previous example, the silence of
the enforcement agencies would have been compatible with several
views about "quantitative substantiality" (all of which are subsumed
under the notion that aggregate requirements contract activity was not
so objectionable as to justify the resource expenditures involved in
policy clarification): (1) that some degree of restraint was required of
suppliers but that most were then-because of the deterrent effect of
Standard Stations or for other reasons-exercising the necessary re-
straint; (2) that as long as outlets were expanding in most industries,
no policy decision need be made; (3) that although a strict policy would
be needed, no such need then existed; or (4) that the most permissive
construction of Standard Stations was all that the statute required.
While the enforcement agencies did not need to clarify require-
ments contract policy in order to bring about compliance with what,
on any of the above assumptions, they deemed proper behavior, the
question remains whether they should have enlightened the public
about their policy, especially if it was the most permissive. Their failure
to do so may have meant that some suppliers were avoiding the use
of requirements contracts in the mistaken belief that they were re-
quired to do so by law. From the standpoint of promoting compliance
with the enforcement agencies' views of the law, however, these agencies
had no incentives to clarify the existing vagueness in the governing
standard.
Besides the deterrent effect produced by implied threats of en-
forcement in its marginal areas, an imprecisely-worded prohibition
also enables agency enforcement officials to affect behavior by threaten-
ing enforcement against penumbrally-covered conduct. An imprecisely-
worded prohibition also delegates to enforcement officials the deter-
mination of its operative effects, since these officials may by their ac-
quiescences, statements, or conversations indicate more precisely the
149 Id. at 304 n.6.
150 Id. at 309.
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generic types of conduct they will treat as covered or not covered by
the prohibition. Similarly, by initial warnings, threats, or clearances
they may communicate more specific and individualized applications of
the prohibition.' 1 Such administrative techniques also insulate from
judicial review conduct compliance obtained by enforcement threats
and facilitate the disposition of challenges to these enforcement threats
in private settlements.
From the standpoint of resource allocation, an imprecisely-worded
prohibition may be more compatible with the administering agency's
control over its litigation expenditures than a more precisely-worded
one: in administering the former, the agency could choose when to
institute or not to institute suit without creating the appearance of
nonenforcement that would accompany the selective enforcement of a
precisely-worded prohibition. Moreover, enforcement through judicious
use of threatened (as opposed to actually instituted) suits might be the
most effective way to influence conduct in substantive areas where the
regulatory authority cannot allot a substantial amount of manpower or
funds.
A difficulty with the last-mentioned procedure, however, might
arise when an admonition from the regulatory authorities is not ob-
served. Threatened suits are relatively costless, but carrying out threats
is not. If the regulatory authorities, for whatever reason, were to feel
committed to enforcing all of their admonitions and threats, then a
tool that could be employed cheaply could also become a double-edged
sword giving the persons threatened the power to force the enforce-
ment agency into committing its funds and manpower to litigation
where its intrinsic social and regulatory importance would not merit
that expenditure. Yet such a resource misallocation may not be a
phenomenon entirely unknown to enforcement instrumentalities of
diverse kinds. It seems to have afflicted the police who have on occasion
let challenges to their authority provoke them into arrests that consume
manhours not justified by the underlying offenses,' 52 and the suspicion
has sometimes existed that the Antitrust Division will bring lawsuits
against noncomplying advisees regardless of the intrinsic importance
of the matter in dispute and regardless of whether suit would have been
brought if its advice had not been given and rejected.'53
151 Observe, however, that the dynamics of regulatory approvals or disapprovals may
impel the formulation of standardized evaluative criteria in order to cope with voluminous
transactions. See text accompanying notes 111-27 supra. See also K. DAVIs, supra note 32,
at 109-10. As the illustration in the Davis book shows, however, standardized evaluative
criteria will not always be willingly disclosed by the officials who have formulated them.
152 See W. LAFAvE, supra note 5, at 102-04, 146-49.
153 See note 84 supra.
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Whether a practice of invariably backing up scorned advice with
a suit for enforcement is a defensible use of scarce enforcement re-
sources depends in part upon the types and importance of the cases
for which advice is sought and the degree to which that advice is ob-
served. The enforcement apparatus maintains its general credibility
by ensuring that its advice will be taken seriously. But we earlier ob-
served that it is not always "general" credibility that is important. If,
for example, the Antitrust Division disapproved in advance a particular
transaction that was performed anyway, and the Division took no ac-
tion against it, an inference would arise that with respect to this type
of transaction the advance advice of the Division need not always be
taken as embodying an enforcement commitment if disregarded. But
if the transaction was sufficiently (and recognizably) unique, the loss of
the perceived enforcement threat would not necessarily accompany the
Division's advice on other transactions.
The real question is the degree of general nonenforcement implicit
in a particular act of nonenforcement. An agency response to a very
unique situation does not say anything about its response to other
situations. On the other hand, a unique situation may be categorized
by the agency for its enforcement purposes with other "unique" situa-
tions-that is, with those falling into nonrecurring patterns. If so,
a lack of enforcement of advice concerning an unimportant, because
nonrecurring and hence unique, situation would imply nonenforcement
of advice on other unimportant and nonrecurring situations. On this
analysis, enforcement of a supervising agency's advice on unimportant
questions would need to be maintained in order to preserve a high level
of perceived enforcement commitment on advice relating to other non-
recurring situations. Since, however, an enforcement agency can com-
mit itself expressly or not as it chooses, it does have the option of in-
cluding an express enforcement commitment in advice relating to
matters that it deems sufficiently important, while relying on bluff and
sporadic enforcement suits to obtain compliance with advice on matters
of lesser consequence.
Explanations of the conscious use of imprecision by regulatory
bodies largely depend upon whether more effective control can be
achieved through imprecise than precise standards. The arguments for
precise standards are that they are more capable of self-application,
easier to enforce, and tend, if consistently enforced against violators, to
engender a normative force that makes them increasingly self-enforcing.
But since these effects are most likely to occur in circumstances in which
recurring patterns of conduct are found, it will be a factual matter
whether, in a given context, the most effective impact upon conduct
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can be obtained from standards that are relatively precise or imprecise.
Since the dichotomy between precise and imprecise standards is not
complete (for it is usually possible to combine them) the more accurate
question is whether, in the light of available enforcement agency re-
sources and the amounts of these resources that would be consumed
in standard clarification, the existing combinations of varying degrees
of precision and imprecision are optimum from the standpoint of in-
fluencing conduct in the directions officially desired.
G. A Caveat
The interconnections between enforcement resources, indefinite-
ness of standards, and caseload volume that have been developed must
now be rather drastically qualified. They must be qualified on the
Hartian notion that law observance is, after all, largely a cooperative
venture between lawmakers and law observers in which the latter volun-
tarily accept the standards made by the former as criteria by which to
govern their behavior. Attention was called above to situations in which
persons in like circumstances responded differently to the same law.
This behavioral disparity, insofar as it was properly attributable to
law, was said to raise the classic problem of justice. Now let us see how
that problem can be analyzed, and perhaps partially explained away.
1. Willing Compliance and the Regulation of Aggregate Behavior
When standards are imprecise, and hence leave room for doubt
in their application to individual cases, their acceptance by affected
persons as behavioral criteria may very well result in persons in like
situations acting differently because they honestly attribute differing
meanings to the same imprecise standards. Sometimes, as when official
standards incorporate value terms (for example, "prudence," "reason-
ableness," "fraud"), or are otherwise verbally imprecise, they serve as
directional guides for conduct-that is, persons whose actions are af-
fected by such guides are expected to use them as conduct-referents.
But broad official directions cannot be expected to supply precise an-
swers to factually unique situations. Thus, persons concerned are dele-
gated the primary responsibility for applying the directions to their
respective individual circumstances. The "prudent man" standard 154 of
154 Although the "prudent man" standard is used in tort law to assess the propriety
of past conduct for the purposes of allocating losses caused by accidents, it describes a
normative standard-a standard of reasonable care-that most people probably feel should
govern their conduct toward others at the time they act.
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tort law and various "fraud" prohibitions 55 are illustrative. In those
areas, government specification of the precise forms of individual be-
havior would be both unworkable and intolerable. 156 The societal goal
is the permeation of individual activity by these values, and the forms
that such activity must take in hosts of individual applications cannot
be legislated in precise detail. Some latitude in individual applications
of those and similar norms will necessarily result: one person will think
"prudence" requires a speed of fifteen miles per hour below the speed
limit in a given snowstorm; another, in the same storm, will find a
five mile per hour reduction prudent; and still another will believe no
reduction in speed is necessary. Yet each will consider his actions
governed by a standard of prudence or reasonable care.157
Such latitude, however, is more descriptive or predictive than
normative in the sense that the enforcement authorities do not delib-
erately seek inconsistent applications of officially-formulated standards.
Rather, these inconsistencies should be seen as necessary concomitants
of embodying an official policy in imprecise terms. Moreover, a posture
of official nonrecognition of latitude in norm interpretation is pre-
served in the power of the governing authorities to examine the cor-
rectness of any individual norm application in an after-the-fact enforce-
ment proceeding. Thus, in the example considered earlier, if penalties
attached to violations of a statute condemning "discrimination," an
employer could be penalized for following the less demanding course
which was all that he believed the law required of him. 58
It should be noted, however, that the "norm" to which the actor
related his conduct when he performed it was the officially-promulgated
standard, that is, the antidiscrimination, prudent man, or antifraud
provisions. The "norm" applied in the enforcement proceeding is less
open-ended because it is applied in a context where previously doubtful
155 Besides actual and constructive common law fraud, "fraud" prohibitions have
been embodied in many places in the law. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78o(c)(1)-(2) (1964); 3
L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1421-30 (2d ed. 1961).
156 But cf. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
157 Compare the varying employer conduct hypothesized in the face of the antidis-
crimination statute previously described. Text accompanying note 147 supra.
158 This may also have been the situation involved in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S.
80 (1943). According to Justice Frankfurter, no equity court had ever laid down a rule
that officers and directors could not acquire interests in a reorganized company during the
period of the reorganization. It also appeared that the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1964), was reasonably and in good faith interpreted
by the officers and directors involved not to forbid the acquisition of such interests during
the reorganization period. Yet the Court indicated that the officers and directors of the
Federal Water Service Corporation could be denied interests in the reorganized company
on the basis of an agency application of the Act.
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questions of construction are answered-the hypothetical antidiscrim-
ination provision may require affirmative hiring efforts, the prudent
man standard may require reductidn of speed in a heavy snowstorm,
and antifraud provisions may require full discosure of all relevant
information.
If societal goals are seen as implemented through aggregate rather
than through individual conduct, they are achieved when the imprecise
standards are used as referents even though the referents may occasion-
ally be applied differently in similar circumstances. There will be no
need for official intervention solely because differing applications have
occurred since it is general rather than individual conduct which is
being officially controlled. In the situation described, the supervising
agency tolerates latitude, within limits, in the interpretation and ap-
plication of a standard. In one sense, therefore, the agency is not "regu-
lating" conduct; it has delegated the interpretation and application of
the standard to those subject to it. Within limits of toleration, behavior
may be influenced by apprehension of sanctions (whose application
may be unlikely), but within those limits conduct is basically influenced
by voluntary, internalized acceptance of the official standard as a be-
havioral referent and by the individual (and not necessarily consistent)
interpretations and applications of that referent by regulated persons.
Accordingly, conflicting individual applications of the standard will
call for official intervention through an enforcement or restructuring
proceeding if the conflicting behavior brings into question the work-
ability of the standard as a general conduct guide. Do the general pro-
hibitions of discrimination and of fraud have an adequate impact on
conduct? Are they effective directional guideposts?159 Official interven-
tion will be called for if an individual application attains such notoriety
that it threatens the workability of the standard as a conduct guide;
it will be appropriate, as an educative tool, when the agency sees a
need for a clarification of the standard; it will also occasionally be
necessary as reenforcement. The reenforcement function can best be
reconciled with fairness towards the person proceeded against when
the standard as applied in his case-in the context of custom, usage,
legislative history, and the facts peculiar to the case-involves a "core"
application of the standard, one in which doubtful questions of inter-
pretation are absent. From a purely functional viewpoint, it is, of
course, unnecessary that no doubtful questions of interpretation have
impregnated the conduct proceeded against, and indeed the practice
of resolving such questions in enforcement proceedings will encourage
159 Cf. L. WrTGNsrraN, supra note 34, 242, at 88e.
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the development of a safety margin around an area of prohibited
conduct, and thereby strengthen the effectiveness of the core prohibi-
tion. However, punishment imposed with respect to conduct whose il-
legality was clarified only after the fact, does, as we have seen, raise
problems concerning the fair treatment of an accused.
In the situation described, where some latitude in interpretation
is tolerated within outside limits, the workability of standards is deter-
mined by how well they serve to guide conduct. Imprecision may be
acceptable not only when, as we have already seen, it affects a small
share of the cases, but also when the conduct that is attributable to
the imprecise standard is, in the aggregate, socially tolerable. Professor
Friedman has told us that any but the most precise-"quantified"--
standards break down when they are subjected to constant testing at
the margins; a standard that may be adequate for dealing with a few
cases becomes grossly inadequate for dealing with hundreds because
voluminous applications of any standard expose its inability to make
appropriate distinctions.160 But relatively imprecise standards, like
"prudent man," or indeed "fraud," may survive voluminous applica-
tions when these applications are not compared, one with another. The
"prudent man" standard works, and makes sense, because the reference
in each case is back to the original imprecise standard and not to each
of the many cases in which the standard has been specifically applied
and "elaborated."161
When a supervising agency attempts to seize control of a behavioral
area, consciously or unconsciously attempting to reserve to itself the
final decision as to the propriety of every transaction-by restructur-
ing nonconforming transactions, threatening punishment proceedings
against persons contemplating transactions of which the agency dis-
approves, or actually bringing punishment proceedings against every
violator of its standards-it faces the work overload discussed above
that will exert an imperative towards precision in standard formula-
tion.162 When its restructuring or punishment proceedings are designed
less for precise "control" over every incident than for the "education"
160 Friedman, supra.note 110, at 815, 818.
161 In normal activity, a person attempts to be "prudent" or to use "care"; he does not
compare his contemplated conduct with that of others or with court decisions. Similarly,
judges and juries apply a "prudent man" standard in negligence cases. They do not
attempt to refine the standard for use in other cases nor do they seek to relate their own
decision to the outcome of previous cases. This process is analogous to that used by courts
of civil law countries, which, in each case, rely on the original code provision rather than
the decisions that have elaborated it.
162 See text accompanying notes 152-53 supra.
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of its public about revisions in those standards, the pressures for preci-
sion that volume exerts are eased. Volume-generated pressures may re-
main to the degree that the agency seeks to assert a high degree of
control not only over conduct beyond the outer limits of toleration,
but over the exact limits of toleration themselves. The agency may use
its "educational" role as a normative guide for its own conduct in
deciding when and where to bring enforcement actions or to issue rules
and policy statements. This use, combined with the agency's perception
of punishment-administering and conduct-restructuring as largely re-
enforcement activities subservient to a primary goal of promoting
voluntary compliance with agency standards, may help ease the pres-
sures generated by the factors of case volume, verbal imprecision in
standards, agency resources, and the traditional imperative of equality
of treatment.
2. Educationally-Directed Proceedings
Proceedings brought for their "educational" value have their own
imperatives. They will fail of their purpose if their outcomes confuse
rather than clarify. Sometimes a proceeding with a thrust inconsistent
with an earlier decision is a necessary corrective to the regulated public's
use of the earlier decision as a conduct guide. Here the "inconsistency"
is better described as "modification" of a behavioral standard than as
a contradiction of it. But if the impact of a decision is so to confuse
that fewer people are acting as the governing agency wishes after the
decision was rendered than before, then the educational objective of
that proceeding has obviously failed.
Educational proceedings make sense when they create or clarify
standards that regulated persons accept as conduct-referents. To do this
the proceedings must be generalizable to other situations. Some factors
in an official proceeding must be sufficiently relevant and applicable to
other cases that the proceeding, principally through its decision and
accompanying opinion, creates or clarifies standards and thereby makes
official policies more self-applicable by regulated persons. Otherwise,
an official proceeding has relevance only to the case at hand-and hence
contributes nothing to the ability of regulated persons to govern their
own conduct. Often one will encounter the tendency of many adminis-
trators to speak of the significance of each case as largely confined to
its own "facts." '11 3 Of course, every case is distinguishable on its "facts,"
but there must be connecting analytical links-connecting rationales
for the decisions-or else each case is purely a unique event having no
163 Cf. 1 K. DAvis, supra note 111, § 4.16, at 110-11.
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regulatory significance for other equally unique events under the gen-
eral supervision of the same enforcement agency, and the burden of law
observance is borne to an undue extent by that agency.164 Referring to
every case as a unique regulatory event may betray a restricted view
of the agency as playing primarily a "managerial" rather than an educa-
tional role,165 and one perhaps in excess of its real capacity to admin-
ister. In fact, many agencies with restructuring powers-for example,
the power to issue cease-and-desist orders-sometimes tend to see their
function as principally a restructuring one that does not involve the
creation of standards for voluntary application by others. But such a
view of regulatory authority cannot withstand the resource-expenditure
analysis that we have already considered.
H. Standard Development, Delegation, and Secrecy
The interrelation between the substance of officially-promulgated
normative standards and the resources entrusted to the body charged
with their enforcement possesses a time dimension in which rule in-
determinacy because of nondevelopment meets rule indeterminacy
because of officially-maintained secrecy. This time dimension is also
related to the process by which evaluation standards used by officials
can develop into normative standards by which the public regulates
itself. Let me be more explicit. The policy of a government enforce-
ment agency develops over time. In agencies charged with policy
development, initial steps in the development process frequently are
made by lower-echelon staff members: unless the rule concerns a mat-
ter of great import, an efficient allocation of agency resources may call
for delegation of less important matters to these lower-ranking per-
sonnel. Accordingly, such personnel may often formulate rules govern-
ing their own behavior in relation to the regulated public.
In performing its enforcement function, an agency that normally
acts on the basis of complaints submitted to it (such as the FTC) 66
may be substantially guided in its prosecution decisions by the rec-
ommendations of its lower-echelon personnel. Internal rules governing
agency responses to given categories of complaints may be drawn at
low staff levels and these rules may never involve the Commission or
its higher-level staff members. The result is that nothing emanates from
the Commission suggesting that certain forms of conduct-lawful under
:164 See text accompanying notes 126-38 supra.
165 Cf. Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's
Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 762, 771 (1962). See also note 181 infra.
16 See, e.g., Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and
Procedure, 48 MwN. L. REv. 888, 393-96 (1964).
1971]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
the lower-echelon policies-are illegal. Since the burden is on the
Commission to act if it wishes to prevent conduct, this type of delega-
tion of authority may give to lower-echelon personnel the power to
withhold action that would bring areas of conduct under the scrutiny
of the supposed "policy-making" echelons of the agency. If those lower-
echelon personnel have the power to bring (or to refrain from bringing)
issues to the attention of the higher-ranking "policy makers," the
nonexercise of that power may sometimes mean that no official action
is taken to clarify doubtful standards of conduct. Since this in turn
means that regulated persons are left to make their own interpretative
judgments about how these standards apply to themselves, some will
construe the law more harshly against themselves than will others and
persons in like situations will be guided by different conduct standards.
Although this result is at odds with the classical ideal of "justice"
under which the same "law" would be applied to people in similar
situations,167 and may be at odds with a more modem concern with the
"effectiveness" of attempts at conduct control, the application of dif-
ferent "law" is ultimately due to the failure of the policy-making arm
of the agency to clarify the applicable conduct standards, and that fail-
ure may be a function of a need to allocate the limited time of the
policy-making echelons to more important tasks. The failure of the
FTC and the Justice Department for many years to clarify their own
policies on the appropriate degree of control that a manufacturer might
exercise over the selling territories of its dealers 68 can perhaps be
justified on the ground that the policy-making echelons in those agen-
cies were preoccupied with more important matters. And, whether or
not the policy-making echelons address themselves to further resolu-
tion of particular regulatory problems-such as formulation of stand-
ards governing vertical mergers in the cement industry,169 filling in
the questions left unanswered in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 170 or formulating rules governing the use of the word "free" in
advertising 71-- depends in part upon whether lower-ranking officials
bring these matters to their attention. This may depend in turn on
judgments by the lower-ranking officials as to whether higher-level con-
167 M. GINSBERG, supra note 94.
168 See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 872 U.S. 258 (1968), in which-7 years
after the enactment of the Sherman Act-the Court observed that the case was the first one
brought before it "involving a territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement." See also
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
169 FTC Release (Jan. 17, 1967), in 1 TRADE REG. REP. 4510 (1968).
170 888 U.S. 365 (1967).
171 FTC Release (Dec. 8, 1958), in 4 TRADE REG. REP. 40,210 (1967).
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sideration of such problems is required or whether they can be effec-
tively and correctly disposed of at the lower levels. Thus, for example,
if lower-level Justice Department officials accept dealer handling of
a token amount of competing products as compliance with the Schwinn
insistence that a dealer accept consignments from more than one pro-
ducer,172 the question of how large a proportion of competing products
a dealer must handle in order to bring himself within the permissive
Schwinn rule governing consignment arrangements may not be pressed
upon the higher echelons for decision. The Department may then leave
this question of "tokenism" unanswered.
A variation of this type of process occurs when lower-ranking
personnel do indeed take unusual matters to the policy makers or when
the policy makers periodically review the work of their subordinates.
Here a decision to refrain from clarifying policy in certain areas, such
as in refinement of the Schwinn problem or in private brand price
discrimination, 7 8 is more clearly that of the policy makers themselves.
They may avoid clarification in the face of private activities in these
areas by deciding to leave them unchallenged, in which case they may
be implying that their time can be more productively spent upon more
important tasks. The result is that many questions necessarily remain
unclarified and the regulated public is frequently left to its own devices
in deciding whether to embark upon particular courses of conduct in
areas that are nominally subject to regulation.
Individual assessments of the prohibitionary scope of vague or
ambiguous standards conflict with the functions of the regulators un-
less the vagueness or ambiguity affects only a fringe area of conduct
safely beyond the realm of that to which the agency objects. Such de
facto delegation to individual persons or firms to apply a vague or
ambiguous law to themselves may be objectionable to the extent that
their expectations are jeopardized by the power of an enforcement
agency later to make its own construction of that law in a punishment
or restructuring proceeding. Aware of the possibility that unless the
application of vague or ambiguous standards is clarified beforehand
the enforcement agencies may subsequently place an adverse construc-
tion on a presently vague standard, businessmen and others frequently
demand clarification of the relevant legal standard before they under-
take potentially affected transactions. But, as noted above, agency of-
ficials primarily charged with policy determination may not be prepared
to devote their own time to many of the needed clarifications; and yet
172 388 U.S. at 381.
178 FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966).
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they probably feel that to delegate policy-making responsibility to
others would be to forfeit their own functions.
How then can the private demands for certainty be reconciled
with unclear agency standards and with the limited time of the prin-
cipal policy makers? One way is for the agency's policy makers to dele-
gate to relatively subordinate personnel the power to answer individual
inquiries while committing the agency to honor the replies so given.
Such an arrangement is familiar. It is followed in the SEC,'7 4 and is
highly formalized in the Internal Revenue Service's rulings proce-
dures. 7 5 Notice, however, that the reconciliation of private demands
for certainty with official uncertainty is carried out by committing the
agency involved to its answers only in the particular cases addressed;
the agency remains uncommitted to persons to whom it has not ad-
dressed its advice individually. Indeed, the Internal Revenue Service
is quite explicit in denying that one can properly rely on a ruling
given to another person; it even goes so far as to state that the Service
does in fact ignore relevant precedent created in its rulings processes. 76
Advice from the SEC is said to involve higher-echelon officials,
including at times the Commission itself, when the importance of the
matter warrants it (or when an inquirer insists upon it),177 but full-
scale evaluation of the regulatory area concerned may result in policy
conclusions different from those embodied in answers to particular in-
quiries. The system of secret advice in force in the past nonetheless may
have had the effect of preserving the Commission's freedom from com-
mitment: in an individual case that agency committed itself only to
the particular person addressed, and the agency ensured that its com-
mitment was so limited by refusing to make that ruling public. 78 Until
recently, the FTC's strange advisory rulings system preserved the ut-
most freedom from commitment by that agency; the secrecy of the
rulings were jealously guarded 179 and the Commission answered only
a relative handful of inquiries.180
174 3 L. Loss, supra note 155, at 1844, 1894-95.
175 See, e.g., Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A
Statement of Principles, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1 (1962); cf. 1 K. DAvis, supra note
111.
170 E.g., Introduction to 1970 INT. REv. BuIL. No. 45, at 2.
177 See 3 L. Loss, supra note 155, at 1894-99.
178 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4924 (Sept. 20, 1968). The SEC has now adopted
a policy that would make no-action and interpretive letters public records. SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5098 (Oct. 29, 1970).
179 The FTC has amended its rules to allow publication of advisory opinions and
requests for such opinions. 16 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1970).
180 The Commission issued two advisory opinions in 1964; nine in 1965; 93 in 1966; 52
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Under these arrangements, until the time that the enforcement
agency is prepared to commit itself on a particular issue, the "law" for
some is different from the "law" for others. Those who have had the
initiative or foresight to request an advance ruling may receive favor-
able responses and, accordingly, avoid the burdens borne by those who,
out of ignorance or inertia or other cause, fail to request an advance
ruling and rely instead on their own or their lawyer's interpretation of
a doubtful legal point, construing the "law" less favorably to themselves.
Here an agency of the legal system is administering "law" in a way
which not only operates to treat equals unequally, but which is consci-
ously designed to do so.
This practical compromise between needed administrative flexi-
bility and the demand of private persons for certainty thus sometimes
seems to require for its development the unequal treatment of equally
situated persons. The decision of how all persons in a similar situation
should be treated is too weighty a matter to be entrusted to low-level
civil servants; only the decisions applicable to those few who actually
make affirmative inquiry should be entrusted to them. Policy develop-
ment in such an administrative context is, accordingly, significantly
different from policy development in the judicial context. The courts
also develop policy over time and they too are often reluctant to com-
mit themselves before they are ready. They guard their needed flexi-
bility in a process of judicial restraint. Although their policies may be
developed slowly, however, they are developed in full public view.
Many unclarified questions provoke differing interpretations by affected
persons and thus the judicial process sometimes results in different
people applying to themselves the differing norms that they have con-
strued from a judicial opinion. But the development of administrative
policy promotes the application of differing norms to identical conduct,
not because different persons construe differing operative norms from
the same open-ended, publicly-disclosed language, but because a legal
institution-the governing agency-speaks differently to different per-
sons.
in 1967; 157 in 1968; and 86 in 1969. 1 TRADE REG. RaP. 50 (1970). If the number of
advisory opinions grows, the FTC's ability to clarify its standards both for itself and for
public consumption should increase.
It may not be proper to compare the relatively small number of FTC advisory opinions
with the "thousands" of advisory opinions given qach year by the SEC staff and the
30,000 to 40,000 tax rulings issued each year by the Internal Revenue Service because the
FTC advisory opinions are issued by that Commission itself rather than by its staff, and
because the FTC staff will readily discuss particular problems with inquiring lawyers.
See 3 L. Loss, supra note 155, at 1895; F. Row, PRica DiscsRiMINATION UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON-PATmAN Acr 477 (1962); Caplin, supra note 175, at 9.
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CONCLUSION
In sophisticated systems of regulatory control, giving content to a
substantive standard tends to transfer decision making from officials
to regulated persons. If effectiveness and even-handedness are seen as
desirable guides to administration, they tend to be viewed as restraints
limiting the content that can be placed in a substantive standard. That
content appears to be a function of the amount of resources that a super-
vising agency has available to it and is willing to commit to the enforce-
ment of that standard, and the receptiveness of affected persons to the
standard. That receptiveness is, in turn, dependent upon the ease with
which affected persons can orient their affairs to comply with the stand-
ard. In short, there seems to be a three-way relationship between re-
source expenditure, effectiveness of control, and substantive standards.
If resource expenditure is constant and substantive standards are
also viewed as constant, regulation becomes increasingly ineffective
when resistance to the standards exceeds the ability of the agency to
proceed against offenders. If effectiveness is accepted as an operational
restraint, then the relationship becomes one between resource expendi-
ture and the content of substantive standards.18' But it is necessary to
181 Professors Rawls and Fried, in differing contexts, have attempted to show a rela-
tionship between the necessity for logically consistent decisions and the permissible sub-
stantive content of those decisions. Rawls, in the course of a defense of a rule-oriented
form of utilitarian ethics, finds that the need to formulate decisional criteria for
application by an administrative body exerts a constraint over the types of decisional
criteria that it can be authorized to use. Rawls, supra note 102, at 11-13. Fried, in dis-
cussing the "role" of the United States Supreme Court, asserts that the Court's role is
determined by the way in which the Court frames the issues for its decision. Fried, supra
note 165, at 762. The more particularistically the Court decides certain constitutional
questions, the greater the managerial role it asserts over a plenitude of questions. For
example, in deciding a contest between a congressional investigating committee and a
recalcitrant witness, the Court asserts a more modest role in determining generally the
extent of the legitimate interests of such committees in obtaining knowledge and the
extent of the legitimate rights of witnesses to withhold information than it does by
determining, on the basis of reasons limited to the case before it, whether a particular bit
of information must be disclosed. In the latter case, it asserts a general managerial
authority over both congressional and individual prerogatives. Since the scope of the
Court's managerial role is functionally related to the substantive decisional criteria that
it employs, the choice of the latter role is constrained by constitutional limitations.
Simply put, Rawls and Fried have found that procedural limitations (in a broad sense
of the phrase) affect substantive decisions. Both Rawls and Fried find the use of cate-
goristic (i.e., nonparticularistic) approaches to decision making required; Rawls in the
ethical-rule system that he is defending; Fried in the constraint exerted by the limited
"role" that the Court is constitutionally permitted to exercise. Both then find that the
necessity to follow categoristic as opposed to particularistic approaches to decision making
exerts an influence over what the substantive content of those decisions can be. In our
analysis we have found a categoristic approach to administrative decision making required
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modify this relation by focusing upon the internal acceptance of legal
standards as a widespread phenomenon and yet, at the same time, to
recognize the latitude in application that imprecise standards facilitate.
Hence, there is an official educational function to elucidate conduct
standards which is different from enforcement and which might be an
official concern on a par with enforcement proceedings or restructuring
objectionable behavior. This is especially true in areas-such as anti-
trust-where private enforcement actions can follow official standard
creation. But educational objectives themselves exert a tendency to-
wards precision in standard application. Recognition of a relation be-
tween the official need to facilitate and encourage conduct conformable
to official views of acceptability and the constraint of limited official
resources may generate a greater degree of official consciousness that
precision in policy formulation is a tool that, where employed in a
sophisticated fashion, may produce greater regulatory control than
presently exists.
Recognition of the interrelations between substantive content of
standards, the resources available to enforce them, and the supervising
official agency's educational role may constitute the beginning of an
attempt to come to grips with the common complaint that many ad-
ministrative agencies have failed to clarify their standards.8 2 The first
step in finding a remedy for unclarified standards is to identify their
causes and the circumstances in which such standards can be expected.
Recognition of the relationship between resources expended and
the substantive content of regulation would seem to direct both the
agencies and their critics to choose priorities among substantive areas
and degrees of substantive control to be exerted in those areas. Where
can the agency obtain the most socially-beneficial impact within its
staff and budgetary constraints? Agencies and their critics ought to
recognize that undeveloped standards in a substantive area ought to
reflect a low priority of regulation in that area. It should reflect official
unconcern either for the area itself or with the details of conduct in
the area. In either event, the agency should be saying through the
medium of undeveloped standards that for the present it is concerned
only with the more flagrant cases in the areas affected by those stand-
ards. This emphasis upon priorities, in turn, suggests a focus upon
by the need to use limited budget and personnel resources effectively. The latter con-
straint, if recognized by a perceptive administrator, should exert a more powerful
influence over substantive standards than would the decisional constraints discovered by
either Rawls or Fried.
182 E.g., Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better
Definition of Standards, 75 H..gv. L. REv. 863, 867 (1962).
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planning. Although long-range planning has not been a particular forte
of many agencies in the past, recognition of the underlying three-way
relationship among agency resource expenditures, effectiveness of con-
trol, and the substantive content of regulation gives a new importance
to planning.
The need for planning is incidental to the three-way relationship
described. But the significance of even this relationship ought not to
be overstated. At present it is probably more useful in evaluating what
officials could do than what they in fact do. Moreover, some agencies,
such as the NLRB, may find that standards can best be developed by
dealing case-by-case with individualized factual situations and that the
emergent standards are unlikely ever to bear a significant relation to
a cost analysis of various official regulatory options. Other agencies, such
as the SEC, may find that standards and long-range goals emerge from
in-depth studies of particular substantive areas rather than from cost
analysis as such. However, the three-way relationship does, by furnish-
ing a guide to substantive standard content within a regulatory system,
provide a theoretical tool for relating the practical problems of ad-
ministration to the problems of communicating laws and legal policies
from officials to affected persons.
